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Impostor scams have recently become the most common type of consumer scam 
in America, surpassing identity theft. It has never been easier and more profitable 
to be an impostor scammer. Though the core of these scams dates back centuries, 
these fraudsters consistently find novel ways to manipulate human motives and 
emotions. Nonetheless, the public should not give up hope. Policymakers and 
private actors can slow down this scourge if they focus on the key chokepoints that 
impostor scammers rely upon to achieve their ends. This Article provides a 
roadmap for a solution to impostor scams, offering specific suggestions for 
mitigating this fraud today, while advocating the adoption of a “least-cost 
avoider” approach to address the whole of the ongoing problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Impostors are scoundrels who pretend to be someone they are 
not for their personal gain. They have been swindling Americans 
out of their money and property for centuries.1 Today, however, 
impostors are operating on a much broader scale, using new tech-
nology and hiding in distant jurisdictions. Impostor scams are now 
public enemy number one—the most frequently reported category 
of consumer fraud, according to the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), even exceeding identify theft complaints.2 They account for 
nearly $500 million in consumer losses, and that figure includes
only reported consumer losses,3 so total losses may be larger but im-
possible to measure.
In this Article, I explore how impostor scams are generally im-
possible to stop. Impostor tricks are diverse, clever, and innovative. 
Public education has limitations. Technological advances in com-
munications, the ascent of social media, and new payment systems 
have supercharged the ability of scammers to commit fraud with 
minimal downside. Impostors have never been able to reach so 
many potential marks so inexpensively and with so little fear of 
consequences from prosecution and enforcement.
In the days before the Internet, global telecommunication, and 
advanced payment systems, impostor scams required perpetrators 
to operate on a smaller scale and assume more risk. Imposture in 
the flesh requires a deeper time investment and, quite often, direct 
physical exposure to those who might unmask and report the im-
postor. Today, impostors can spam millions with their fraud at-
tempts from a safe distance.
1. See EDWARD BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF
14–23 (2017) (describing the “shape-shifting, never-changing world of fraud”).
2. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2018, at 84
(2019).
3. See id. at 8, 84.
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Despite these complications, it is imperative for policymakers 
and regulators to throw considerably more sand into the gears of 
impostor scams. Although such efforts to eliminate them might 
prove futile, failure to pursue them aggressively will only enable 
their acceleration. Technological and educational interventions 
from the public and private sectors can reduce the effectiveness of 
impostor fraud efforts, thus raising the cost of implementing these 
scams. Without sustained interventional efforts, impostor scams 
will proliferate even faster. The goal should not be an unrealistic 
elimination of impostor ploys that have durable core effectiveness. 
Instead, the goal should be to reduce their incidence. The alterna-
tive, which would be to give up or let up, would enable the scam-
mers to improve their methods and thrive.
The question turns to how to find the right levers and weapons 
to reduce impostor fraud in what likely will be a perpetual struggle. 
Certain common avenues or chokepoints can be throttled to raise 
the costs of committing impostor fraud. Scammers often rely on 
legitimate intermediaries in communications services and financial 
transactions to achieve their ends. Policymakers, regulators, and 
private actors themselves should ensure that intermediaries inter-
nalize some of the responsibility for slowing down impostor scam-
mers. These intermediaries are the classic low-cost avoiders in this 
scenario and are often best positioned, at the very least, to make 
impostor scamming more expensive and difficult.4
In Part I, I discuss the power of the impostor and the history of 
the impostor scam. I describe the transformation of impostor 
scams, in their various forms, into “public enemy number one.”
Part II explains how the economics of launching impostor scams 
dramatically improved and why the scourge has become an epi-
demic. Part III discusses regulatory and enforcement efforts to ad-
dress impostor fraud and why they have fallen short. In Part IV, I 
suggest that waging a concerted war against impostor fraud is pos-
sible, and I offer specific tactical suggestions that put more burden 
on telecommunications providers, social media platforms, and fi-
nancial intermediaries to put their unique “chokepoint” positions 
to good use.
Today, most losses from impostor fraud fall on the victims. By 
shifting more responsibility on potentially preventative parties at 
the chokepoints for impostor fraud, a least-cost-avoider-like ap-
proach could be adopted. Though no “silver bullet” exists to re-
4. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
135–40 (1970) (famously contending that the cost of accidents could be minimized by as-
signing liability to the cheapest cost avoiders).
614 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:3
solve impostor fraud, as fraudsters will always innovate, I conclude 
that mitigation of the problem may be quite possible.
I. THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF IMPOSTOR FRAUD
There is no doubt that impostor scams have become a top con-
sumer fraud nuisance in the United States. Impostor scam reports 
are up twenty-five percent since 2016, surpassing identity theft re-
ports and replacing debt-collection complaints as the most com-
monly-reported consumer complaint.5 The Consumer Sentinel, 
which aggregates federal and state data, counted over three mil-
lion total reports of fraud, identity theft,6 and other types of com-
plaints in 2018. Fraud accounted for forty-eight percent of these 
complaints by volume and identity theft for fifteen percent.7 With-
in the fraud category, the total 2018 reported losses from impostor 
schemes towered over the rest at $488 million, nearly exceeding
the total losses associated with the other top ten types of fraud
combined.8
Though the scale of the problem is new, impostor scams are as 
old as the hills. As I discuss in Section I.A, impostor powers find 
deep roots in our social history and constructs. Section I.B shows 
how the underlying schemes from the nineteenth century still re-
tain their same form today. In detailing the recent explosion of 
impostor fraud that vaulted it to the current epidemic, in Section 
I.C, I show that today’s impostor fraud just employs modern tech-
nology and social structures to use the same basic means to achieve 
the same ends.
A. The American Impostor
Impostors have long captured the American imagination. In F. 
Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, the protagonist, a con artist 
from the Midwest, constructs a false identity as an Oxford gradu-
ate, a hero of the Great War, and an all-around “old sport,” wooing 
old money socialites to cover his status as an organized crime fig-
5. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 84.
6. The FTC distinguishes “identity theft” from impostor fraud. The Sentinel describes 
the identity theft scenario as when a scammer “appropriates . . . personal identifying infor-
mation (like a Social Security number or credit card account number) to commit fraud or 
theft.” Id. at 82. In effect, the difference, though subtle, is one of significance. The victim of 
the impostor scam has been ripped off by someone claiming to be who they are not. The 
victim of an identity theft scam has been ripped off by someone claiming to be that victim.
7. Id. at 4. Thirty-eight percent of complaints were tagged with “other.” Id.
8. Id.
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ure.9 The 2002 Steven Spielberg movie Catch Me if You Can, based 
on the autobiography of Frank Abagnale, Jr., documented 
Abagnale’s false impersonation of an airline pilot, an attorney, and 
a physician, among other personas.10 More recently, an entire tele-
vision series, Imposters, aired for two seasons on the Bravo net-
work.11 The protagonist of this show was a “persona-shifting con 
artist” romance scammer pursued by “a trio of her recent, heart-
broken victims.”12
Impostors have faked credentials to induce a major research 
university into hiring them as a senior administrator,13 fooled the 
media into covering ridiculous fake stories14 (long before the 
emergence of the “fake news” concept-meme), and impersonated 
government officials and new eyewitnesses to prank broadcasters 
into putting them on the air.15 Whether for money, thrill-seeking, 
or purposes of performance art, determined impostors can use 
similar authority and confidence to achieve their ends. People 
want to believe their stories, or they choose to believe their stories 
because they seek heuristics to enable them to decide about whom 
to listen or assign credibility.16 Though imposture and misuse of 
authority presents all sorts of problems, I focus here on the fraudu-
lent portrayal of identity to scam consumers out of their money.
9. See generally F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (1925).
10. CATCH ME IF YOU CAN (Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
11. Imposters, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5212822/ [https://perma.cc/8339-
6ACP].
12. Imposters: Cast & Info, BRAVO, https://www.bravotv.com/imposters/about [https://
perma.cc/F9BD-AUA8].
13. Falsely claiming to hold advanced degrees from Tufts University and service as a 
Navy SEAL, a highly-paid senior vice president for administration served as top adviser to 
the president of Texas A&M University for over a year, until he was caught. Vimal Patel, Tex-
as A&M Administrator Resigns amid Questions over Resume, THE EAGLE (June 18, 2010), 
https://www.theeagle.com/news/a_m/a-m-administrator-resigns-amid-questions-over-
resume/article_b8fddfb5-95d9-58db-886d-1b1251b04a45.html [https://perma.cc/EX3R-
8L9A]. Coincidentally, the author of this article briefly worked with this man in the private 
sector in the 1990s and completely believed that he held these degrees from Tufts and that 
he had served as a Navy SEAL.
14. See generally Margalit Fox, Alan Abel, Hoaxer Extraordinaire, Is (on Good Authority) Dead 
at 94, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/obituaries/
alan-abel-dies.html (describing Alan Abel’s successful efforts to garner news coverage for his 
hoaxes, including creating “Yetta Bronstein,” a fake candidate for the 1964 presidential elec-
tion, a false claim that he won the New York state lottery, the creation of an advocacy group 
that in the name of decency would cover up the private parts of animals, and faking his own 
death and convincing the New York Times to run the obituary).
15. See Paul Farhi, Prank-call Legend Captain Janks Is Still a Nemesis of News Outlets, WASH.
POST (July 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/prank-call-legend-
captain-janks-is-still-a-nemesis-of-news-outlets/2014/07/30/a9ad9134-175e-11e4-9e3b-7f2
f110c6265_story.html [https://perma.cc/6JWA-36VS].
16. See Miriam J. Metzger, Andrew J. Flanagin & Ryan B. Medders, Social and Heuristic 
Approaches to Credibility Evaluation Online, 60 J. COMMC’N 413 (2010).
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Historian Edward Balleisen observed that the consummation of 
commerce, including consumer commerce, “depend[s] on trust in 
far-flung counterparties across lengthening divides of space.”17 The 
“complexity” of transactions and this general need for social trust 
has always been ripe for exploitation by those who maintain asym-
metric information, and consumers would expect a seller or au-
thority figure, or one purporting to be such, to have that asymmet-
ric information.18 Impostor scams rely on the premise that 
consumers trust those who seem to know more about a problem 
than they do. Swindles “have been especially evident in sectors 
dominated by complex products or services and characterized by 
transactions among strangers.”19
According to Balleisen, “the staying power of the dominant 
forms of deception reflects enduring dilemmas about whom and 
what to trust in a complex, integrated economy shot through with 
inequalities of access to information.”20 A scammer pretending to 
be affiliated with Microsoft, perhaps by spoofing Caller ID, or 
simply, for example, claiming to be from Microsoft, would appear 
to have asymmetric information; that is, the scammer counts on 
having more information than the target. The trust engendered 
can be exploited by scammers who are trying to gather personal 
information or sell a phony fix. These common and “enduring 
psychological [consumer] vulnerabilities” and “cognitive and emo-
tional susceptibilities” have forced “industrialized and industrializ-
ing societies on every continent . . . [to] confront[] . . . commercial 
misrepresentation.”21
Balleisen centers his analysis on the “modern problem of trust in 
the marketplace.”22 He points to more than century-old journalistic 
accounts observing that there was a “perennial crop of fools” always 
falling for “plausible cheats.”23 In 1859, one journalist wondered 
how “the man of to-day, with all the lights of the past to guide him, 
is just as much of a credulous idiot as at any time since the fall of 
Adam?”24 In 1923, however, a reformed swindler observed that no 
amount of education could defeat these schemes.25 William H. 
Crosby, in the book, Confessions of a Confidence Man, noted that 
“[e]very few months the newspapers and periodicals expose some 
17. BALLEISEN, supra note 1, at 5.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 23–33.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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sort of bunko game. . . . The people are much better educated 
than they used to be . . . . But the confidence game is greater than 
ever . . . .”26 Perhaps people aren’t “credulous idiot[s]”—they are 
rational actors who depend on a measure of trust to play in the 
commercial economy.27 The schemes may change, but the psy-
chology of scams does not.
In the nineteenth century, advancements in communication and 
transportation enabled the geographic scope of transactions to ex-
pand, thus putting an increased number of strangers into contact 
with other strangers.28 More frequently, consumers were transact-
ing with others whom they knew by reputation on financial and 
credit matters, investment opportunities, or consumer items.29 Im-
provements in transportation likely fueled the advancement of be-
ing able to work speedily through the mail.30
In an ever-dispersed transactional environment still devoid of 
name brands, firms or scammers could take advantage of consum-
ers more readily because “exacerbated inequalities in access to per-
tinent economic information”would make assessing quality more 
difficult for retailers.31 The very development of brands, which was 
intended to instill consumer trust and confidence in their transac-
tions with distant players, was also used as a tool by scammers. Bal-
leisen notes that the rise of brands reacted to a need for assess-
ment of quality in the developing national marketplace, where
reputation could be harder to assess.32 Like every conceptual inno-
vation, the rise of brands “spawned new opportunities for misrep-
resentation and fraud. . . . so as to carry out fraud against econom-
ic neophytes and sophisticates alike.”33
Even with modern market evolutions, as a whole, technological 
solutions cannot evade the fundamental structure of impostor 
fraud, evident since Herman Melville’s time. Melville observed that 
information asymmetries in the market afforded a blueprint to 
swindlers who realized that in order to pull off a fraud, they “must 
26. EDWARD H. SMITH, CONFESSIONS OF A CONFIDENCE MAN 9 (1923); BALLEISEN, supra 
note 1, at 23.
27. BALLEISEN, supra note 1, at 23.
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Richard Sears of Sears, Roebuck & Co. tangled with fraud accusations from the Post 
Office in 1894. The Post Office refused to deliver return correspondence to Sears as a 
means to stop what they had considered to be fraudulent activity. Id. at 3–4. Though mis-
guided in this instance, the Post Office took initiative as an intermediary chokepoint for 
fraud, and I later contend that the key to slowing down impostor fraud will be to shift re-
sponsibility to the stewards of similar chokepoints.
31. Id. at 24.
32. See id. at 26.
33. Id.
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look the part, possess the right props, [and] know the right cues.”34
Melville may have operated in a time where “Spanish prisoner”
scams, discussed below in Section I.B, dominated, but he might 
recognize the structure of the robocall operation that mimicked 
Microsoft or the IRS. The “Indonesian Hollywood” scam, discussed 
in Section I.B, might not have surprised him one bitThe means, 
the stories, and the instrumentalities of fraud change, but “social 
mimicry” efforts never cease and seemingly never fail to find suc-
cess.35
The dramatic advancements and changes in communications 
over the past twenty years have been just as transformative as the 
nineteenth-century changes in consumer markets. The nineteenth
century first brought the telegraph, and later the telephone,36 and 
speedier and cheaper mail,37 all of which facilitated imposture. 
Twenty-first-century advancements offer similar opportunities for 
the advancement of impostor schemes. The Internet allows people 
falsely to claim affiliation with government entities, including law 
enforcement and legitimate businesses, and to connect using false 
personas through dating and social media applications.38 The now 
close-to-zero cost of long-distance telephone calling, a fairly new 
phenomenon,39 as well as the ease of money transfer facilitated by 
the proliferation of new payment devices like gift cards40 have also 
moved imposture forward by a leap.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 29.
36. For a comprehensive understanding of the development of communications tech-
nology during this period through the early internet, see JOHN BRAY, THE COMMUNICATIONS 
MIRACLE: THE TELECOMMUNICATION PIONEERS FROM MORSE TO THE INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAY (1995).
37. See Fred J. Romanski, The Fast Mail: A History of the U.S. Railway Mail Service,
PROLOGUE MAG., Fall 2005, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/fall
/fast-mail-1.html [https://perma.cc/WU6V-JJTP] (describing the role of the railways in the 
development of postal services).
38. See infra Section I.C.
39. See Freeing Up the Telephone, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/science-and-technology/2015/12/01/freeing-up-the-telephone [https://perma.cc
/SA9T-DYX6] (attributing the historic and recent drops in cost both to technological inno-
vation and competition, particularly from VoIP).
40. Cyndie Martini, Gift Cards: Everyone’s Favorite Gift, Including Criminals, CPO MAG.
(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/gift-cards-everyones-favorite-
gift-especially-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/P8NF-Z7PC] (discussing growth of gift cards 
and associated fraud).
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B. The Past and Present of Impostor Scams: 
New Dogs Learning Old Tricks
Impostor scams have a rich heritage and, in many ways, have re-
tained their original form.41 They were so established by the late 
nineteenth century that contemporaneous news accounts referred 
to these scams as resurgences of an already old problem. An 1898 
New York Times article described the return of an impostor scam, 
one that had acquired the name, “the Spanish [P]risoner.”42 At 
that point, the scheme had become regarded as one of the more 
successful artifices for swindling people out of their money. “As 
it . . . worked in two countries[,] the detection and punishment of 
the operators are practically impossible, especially as the victims 
rarely complain,”43 and the Times expressed suspicion that local au-
thorities overseas may have been in cahoots with the scammers.44
The crux of the Spanish prisoner scheme will sound similar to 
many that we see today, albeit using different communications 
mediums and methods of payment. In the Spanish prisoner 
scheme, a person in the United States would receive a letter pur-
porting to be sent from a person of seeming prominence claiming 
to be a prisoner overseas and explaining that the writer was im-
prisoned for a “political offense.”45 The “prisoner” would contact 
the American mark, claiming that a trusted mutual acquaintance 
(who, of course, could not be named for secrecy purposes) had put 
the prisoner in contact with the mark in order to receive help in 
unlocking a hidden fortune.46 (Today, a simple Google search 
might prevent this racket from getting too far, but even that is un-
certain.)
The “prisoner” might write that he had a daughter being held 
for “board” by a boarding school overseas, but that the prisoner 
had a stash of money in the false bottom of a trunk being held in 
pawn.47 If the American could send money to a trusted overseas as-
sociate to secure the trunk, the money inside the trunk could be 
41. Edward Balleisen’s comprehensive tome details the history of fraud in America and 
the constant dynamics that have driven—and continue to drive it. See BALLEISEN, supra note 
1. However, Balleisen explicitly “steer[s] clear of [discussing] most of the classic swindles 
directed at individuals by con artists” to focus on business fraud. Id. at 10. He severs off 
“bunco steering” (inducing people to play “rigged game[s] of chance”) and the “many types 
of advanced fee scams,” for example. Id. Even though he steers clear of direct discussion, 
much of Balleisen’s work applies to the impostor scams, too, as I discuss infra.
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used to free the daughter, and of course, the American would get 
to keep a substantial portion of the money for their kind service.48
A skilled scammer could find a number of ways to manipulate and 
extract more money from a mark, once hooked. Similar “advance
fee” scams have emanated from places like Nigeria using email and 
social networks,49 making it apparent that modern scammers may 
have updated the scheme, but they certainly did not invent it. Per-
haps an old dog cannot be taught new tricks, but new dogs can be 
taught old tricks—and modernize and improve them.
Like some of today’s schemes, as the Times reported, the Spanish 
prisoner impostor scheme typically operated in two countries, mak-
ing enforcement difficult. Today’s impostor fraud has accelerated 
due to the plunging costs of communication with potential victims 
and the continued ease of finding payment mechanisms to facili-
tate the scheme.50 Apparently, devising a sympathetic story, mixed 
with an opportunity to make money, has a fundamental timeless 
appeal. Again, even before the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Times had reported that the Spanish Prisoner scheme was already 
decades old and difficult to address.
It may prove tempting to conceive of impostor fraud as a phe-
nomenon that only preys on the naïve or vulnerable populations 
like the elderly,51 but such conclusions are mistaken and serve to 
diminish appreciation for the absolute power of impostor fraud. 
Impostor schemes, when artfully designed, can hook an array of 
sophisticated people motivated by fear or by the same core desire 
to leap at opportunities for success.
48. Id.
49. Nigerian Letter or 419 Fraud, Scams and Safety, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/nigerian-letter-or-419-fraud
[https://perma.cc/7MVJ-QWTQ].
50. Old-fashioned letter writing outreach, however, apparently never completely goes 
out of style, despite the labor-intensiveness and postage expense. Professor Eric Goldman of 
Santa Clara Law School shared a handwritten letter that he recently received that originated 
in Uganda. See Letter from “a/k/a likely scammer” to Professor Eric Goldman (July 17, 
2018) (on file with author). The letter purported to be from a young, female student who 
had been forced to drop out of tailoring school because after her father’s death, she was 
unable to continue to afford tuition. The letter seeks Professor Eric Goldman’s charity to 
help her complete school, promising nothing in return. My cursory research into her plea 
for help revealed that there was a website for the tailoring school and the church that ap-
peared to verify elements of the story, but the contact information on the website did not 
mesh with what was in her letter. Although it is possible that this letter writer does exist and 
suffers from these circumstances, a recipient would have to take a leap of faith if he were to 
send money per the instructions.
51. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13 (showing that fraud as a general catego-
ry is reported at all age groups, and perhaps more likely to be reported by younger de-
mographics).
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Consider the recent case of the “Indonesia Showbiz” scam,”52 al-
so known as the case of the “Hollywood Con Queen.”53 In this im-
postor fraud iteration, entertainment industry participants had 
been targeted by a scammer conducting an elaborate impersona-
tion of prominent female studio executives via telephone, text 
messages, or email. The scammer lured the victims to travel to In-
donesia at their own expense to follow up on an attractive job of-
fer. A “driver” would meet the target in Indonesia and then fleece 
the victims for cash for driving services and other services until the 
target realized they were a mark. The scam has taken another turn, 
perhaps toward what could also look like a setup of sexual black-
mail.54 The Hollywood Con Queen scam (or scammers) has 
launched impersonations of “nearly two dozen” people and lured
“dozen[s]” of victims, enough to warrant the FBI creating a
webpage for victims.55
New dogs have indeed learned the old tricks and have occasion-
ally honed them into spectacular acts. As I detail below in my dis-
cussion of scams often delivered through robocalling, many of the 
common impostor scams reported to federal and state authorities 
involve similar elements. They frequently include an overseas 
component that shields scammers from law enforcement, and they 
cruelly manipulate human hopes for a financial or emotional 
windfall or to instill great fear in their targets, all to induce a cash 
transfer.
C. Impostor Scams Today
The Spanish prisoner and Indonesia Showbiz scams provide 
colorful examples of impostor fraud, but impostor fraud has be-
come a routine today. What is modern impostor fraud and how 
does it differ from other categories of fraud? The FTC Consumer 
Sentinel describes impostor fraud as where “[s]omeone pretends 
52. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau Investigation, Seeking Victims in Indonesia Showbiz 
Scam Investigation (July 15, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/resources/victim-services
/seeking-victim-information/seeking-victims-in-indonesia-showbiz-scam-investigation
[https://perma.cc/22KF-3UU5].
53. See Rhodes Murphy, Hollywood’s Mysterious “Con Queen” Is Now Impersonating Marvel 




55. Scott Johnson, FBI Seeks More Victims of Hollywood Con Artist After Marvel Executive Tar-
geted, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 15, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.
com/news/fbi-seeks-more-victims-hollywood-con-artist-marvel-executive-targeted-1137712
[https://perma.cc/TKE9-JXSD] .
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to be a trusted person to get consumers to send money or give per-
sonal information.”56 The Sentinel provides examples of such 
schemes, where each scheme offers a unique twist on the scourge.
There are schemes where the scammer falsely claims a government 
affiliation, like law enforcement and tax authorities, or charities 
and private companies.57 Impersonations of the Internal Revenue 
Service or of a Microsoft-related entity appear to be common fla-
vors of that variety.58 Some schemes involve the scammer claiming 
to be a known friend or relation in an emergency cash crisis.59
Other impostors pretend to be a “romantic interest” and extract 
cash by exploiting that dynamic.60 Because impostor fraudsters 
manufacture authority to manipulate emotions like fear, greed, 
and loneliness to motivate people to “transact” with them or oth-
erwise give them money, combating impostor fraud proves some-
what more complex.
Within the category of impostor fraud reports, the Consumer 
Sentinel breaks them down further.61 Though dollar losses are a 
significant measure, each report reflects some degree of loss to an 
individual, which reflects the infliction of a nonpecuniary and 
emotional impact, as well. Government impostor scams are the 
most heavily reported, accounting for nearly half of all impostor 
scams.62 “Tech support” impostor scam reports tripled between 
2016 and 2018, becoming the second most commonly reported 
impostor scam.63 Business imposture is also on the rise, as the third 
most common.64 Though friends and family and romance scams 
account for only ten percent of impostor scam reports, friends and
family scam reports have spiked nearly fifty percent since 2016, 
while reported incidents of romance scams have nearly doubled.65
1. Government Impostors
“Government impostors” will use counterfeit authority to fake 
their status to appeal, for instance, to the hope of those who think 
they may have had the good fortune of winning a lottery, or to the 
fear of those who think that they might be arrested, imprisoned, or 
56. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 81.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 82.
59. Id. at 81.
60. Id.
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sued for leaving an unknown debt, tax liability, or fees unpaid.66
Government imposture could involve using the telephone, email, 
texting, or other means to inform a victim that they have won a lot-
tery, but in order to collect the big prize, they will have to pay a 
service charge.67 The impostor poses as a lottery official, the Feder-
al Trade Commission, or even fictional agencies such as “the na-
tional consumer protection agency,” or the “National Sweepstakes 
Bureau” as the cover of authority to require the advance payment 
to receive the big winnings.68
Government impostors are also known to use the telephone to 
impersonate the Internal Revenue Service, local sheriff’s offices, 
and even judges to try to “collect” non-existent debts, threatening 
the victim with severe consequences for not paying.69 These 
schemes, as noted below, involve wire transfers and “rechargeable 
money card[s],” also known as gift cards, as mechanisms for the 
victim to transfer money to the impostor.70 Another common varia-
tion involves the imposture of the Social Security Administration, 
also via telephone.71 The scammer poses as an agent, claiming that 
the victim’s social security number has been “blocked” due to sus-
picious and nefarious activity, like use in a crime or an illegal mon-
ey transfer.72 There might be a false reactivation fee involved or an 
instruction to remove money out of a bank account to prevent au-
thorities from seizing it.73 The scammer may also threaten the con-
sequence of discontinuation of Social Security benefits, which for 
many are a complete financial lifeline.74 Imposture of a govern-
ment official in these contexts often exploits the low-cost mecha-
nism of the telephone to reach a range of vulnerable people and a 
set of common mechanisms to facilitate an irreversible money 
transfer.
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2. Tech-support Impostors
Tech support scams often lure victims through outbound tele-
phone calls and fabricated pop-up warnings on websites, where vic-
tims are told that their computer has a virus or malware that they 
must fix with some urgency.75 Tech support scammers also use 
search-word driven web advertisements (driven off keywords 
around tech support) and in search engine results.76 Their goal is 
to convince people to pay for technical assistance that they do not 
need and to solve non-existent technical problems with their com-
puters.77 These scammers impersonate employees at tech compa-
nies, often identifying themselves as associated with Microsoft or 
related entities.78 According to the FTC, the preferred payment 
methods for these scammers include “wiring money, putting mon-
ey on a gift card, prepaid card or cash reload card, or using a 
money transfer app because they know those types of payments can 
be hard to reverse.”79
3. Friends and Family Impostors
Though not the highest in volume, perhaps the cruelest and 
most calculating of scams involves the imposture of family or 
friends in distress or long cons where the impostor poses as a long-
distance romantic partner to steal money from a victim seeking 
companionship. One example of this type of scam is known as the 
“grandparent scam.” As the AARP warns members:
This is how the grandparent scam typically plays out: You 
get a call from someone pretending to be your grandchild. 
The person explains that he is in trouble, with a story that 
goes something like this: “There’s been an accident and 
I’m______ (in jail, in the hospital, stuck in a foreign coun-
try), and I need your help.” The caller adds enough details 
about how, what or where the emergency happened to 
make the story seem plausible. And the distraught caller, 
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you think to yourself, does sort of sound like your grandson 
or granddaughter.80
The social engineering escalates if the victim hooks into this sto-
ry. Under some executions of this scam, the initial caller next di-
rects the target to call another person who will impersonate an au-
thority figure like a physician, an attorney, or a law enforcement 
official, who will offer more of a story.81 The use of an inbound tel-
ephone number and authority enables the impostor to carry the 
deceit further because, as one FTC lawyer put it, “[t]his makes it 
seem more real when you call and talk to the authority.”82 Of 
course, the way out of the jam offered to the grandparent to rescue 
their grandchild is to send or wire money immediately—with a 
message relayed: “Don’t tell Mom and Dad!”83 Sometimes, the vic-
tims will even desperately send cash to the scammers.84 The 
“grandparent” victim may be led to believe that their relative needs 
payment to a hospital for urgent treatment, or to an authority like 
a lawyer or law enforcement official to keep their impostored 
grandchild out of jail.85
Unlike the other scams, which seem to strike broadly, using mas-
sive low-cost telephone outreach operations, scams involving im-
personation of family, friends, and romantic interests may require 
the scammer to invest more in cultivating and grooming individual 
targets. Some of the victims can indeed be hooked at random be-
cause “these scammers are experts at impersonating people they’ve 
never even met . . . . [T]hey may simply wait for their target to use 
a name–‘Steve, is that you?’ “ and take the impersonation from 
there.86 Some scammers buy lists of people who have been easy 
marks before or older people who might fall prey to this type of 
operation.87 Others use information that may be available from so-
cial media sites, where people put their families on open display 
with information about names, relationships, and locations for 
scammers to exploit the dynamics with a high degree of credibil-
ity.88 When scammers add urgency and safety of a loved one to this 





84. Emma Fletcher, New Twist to Grandparent Scam: Mail Cash, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/data-spotlight/2018/12/new-twist-
grandparent-scam-mail-cash [https://perma.cc/N2KK-D2SF].
85. Colino, supra note 80.
86. Fletcher, supra note 84.
87. Colino, supra note 80.
88. Fletcher, supra note 84.
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dynamic, “critical thinking faculties are just not the way they are 
normally.”89 To the scammer who might be operating on a portfo-
lio of marks, the only cost to losing control of such a scheme is the 
opportunity cost, but the emotional and financial costs to the mark 
are substantial.
The payment schemes for this scam are typical of the others, in-
cluding wiring money and the use of gift cards. This particular 
scam, however, may be evolving toward cash payment, delivered 
through the mail or overnight services.90 Perhaps cash has proven 
to be an easier mechanism for extracting money because the older 
segments of the population might not have access or as much fa-
miliarity with newer payments systems or might not have the ease 
of leaving home. Some victims have been instructed to do quite 
specific things with the cash, like “divid[ing] the bills into enve-
lopes and plac[ing] them between the pages of a magazine” before 
sending out the payment,91 perhaps, one speculates, for scammers 
to avoid detection if the cash was being shipped overseas. Scam-
ming people out of cash currency may prove to be the most diffi-
cult system for policymakers and institutions to fix, so extra en-
forcement vigilance may be required here.
4. Romance Impostor Scams
Romance scams are yet another impostor scam, except that in-
stead of using the cover of authority, the scammer assumes a false
identity and cultivates a relationship with their mark, often online. 
This is a modern-day version of in-person scams where the scam-
mer would invest heavily and at greater risk to swindle and deceive
people face-to-face, in what Jill Hasday has extensively documented 
as “an abundance of intimate deception.”92 This recent version, 
largely executed through online dating, involves less in-person risk 
of detection and permits the scammers to access and work on 
more victims simultaneously. Of note, online dating has become a 
leading avenue for how couples meet in the United States, so, of 
course, enterprising impostors will follow along for the ride.93
89. Colino, supra note 80.
90. Fletcher, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW 6 (2019). Hasday documents a 
number of contexts for financial fraud among intimates who know each other in person. Id.
at 16.
93. See generally MICHAEL J. ROSENFELD, REUBEN J. THOMAS & SONIA HAUSEN,
DISINTERMEDIATING YOUR FRIENDS: HOW ONLINE DATING IN THE UNITED STATES DISPLACES 
OTHER WAYS OF MEETING (2019), https://www.pnas.org/content/116/36/17753/tab-
figures-data [https://perma.cc/56PR-SNWX].
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The FTC recently warned the public about this scam on Valen-
tine’s Day, of course.94 “What do we mean by romance scams? 
We’re not talking about the person you thought was ‘the one’ but 
ended up being a dud. We’re talking about people you meet 
online, who lavish you with attention . . . and then ask for mon-
ey.”95 The scammers source their targets from social media and da-
ting sites and go to work from there, using fake profiles or misap-
propriating the identity of a real person.96 Again, the scammers 
seek their “gifts” by wire transfer or, appropriately enough, via gift 
cards.97 The pretext for needing the money might be an emergen-
cy or for a trip to meet up, the former of which is contrived, the
latter never to happen.98 The ability to scale this scam is more chal-
lenging for the swindler than blast robocalling and the time in-
vestment in each target is larger. The potential return from this 
type of scam, however, is apparently higher than the other opera-
tions.99 The median reported loss on all impostor scams is $500,100
while the median loss from romance scams was $2,600, over five 
times as much.101
On the whole, two themes run throughout the recent rise of the 
common impostor scams. First, communication technologies and 
platforms have made the process of imposture less risky and less 
expensive than ever before. Second, payment system innovations, 
particularly the rise of pre-paid gift cards, which can function as 
cash, have also facilitated the ability of impostors to receive pay-
ment. The core structure of the scams, which use fear, greed, and 
in some cases, loneliness, remain the same as they did in the Spanish 
prisoner era, but the ability to seek potential targets and complete 
their victimization has become much easier, less costly, and less 
risky, which explains their rise.
II. IMPOSTOR SCAM ECONOMICS
Like any other economic activity, if the costs and risks of engag-
ing in scams drop and the returns from scams grow or even hold 
steady, more scams will likely surface. Incentives will drive decision 
94. Lisa Weintraub Schifferle, Romance Scams Will Cost You, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 
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making. In the analog era, the “classic” impostor scam often re-
quired the scammer to have a physical presence, which created 
both risk of detection and punishment and required more time in-
vestment. In the modern era, the economics of scamming im-
proved as developments in communications and payment systems 
enabled scammers to scale up their activities inexpensively. This 
lowers costs and expands the reach of scammers, while increasing 
their distance from their victims and, thus, lowering their risk of 
directly confronting enforcement. The economics explain why im-
postor scams have proliferated and prove critical to understanding 
how to slow them down. I discuss next how the economics and use 
of technology evolved over the past several decades.
A. Economics of “Classic” Impostor Scams
The economics of a pre-modern impostor scam emerges crisply 
and colorfully from the facts of a 1957 New Jersey agency law case 
that has become a favorite of a generation of Business Associations’
instructors and students,102 Hoddeson v. Koos Bros.103 This case typi-
fies the architecture of an impostor scam, and the common law 
provided a solution—pushing the cost onto the intermediary for 
negligently allowing the scammer to use their instrumentality and 
legitimacy to pull off the scam.104 The impostor scam that befell the 
shopper, Mrs. Hoddeson, at a retail furniture store, Koos Bros., in 
Rahway, New Jersey serves as an ancestor, perhaps, to the tech-
support scam, where the scammer purports to work for a company, 
but does not. The physical store serves as much as an instrumental-
ity and venue for the transfer of payment as modern payment sys-
tems do in other scams.
Before presenting the facts, the judge observed that impostor 
scams were nothing new, but always evolving: “The occurrence 
which engages our present attention is a little more than conven-
tionally unconventional in the common course of trade. . . . A di-
gest of the story told by Mrs. Hoddeson will be informative and 
perhaps admonitory to the unwary shopper.”105
On a previous visit to Koos Bros., Hoddeson had scouted out 
some pieces of bedroom furniture on display.106 As the court ob-
served, “it has been said that ‘the sea hath bounds but deep desire 
102. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS 29–32 (10th ed. 2018).
103. 135 A.2d 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 703.
106. Id.
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hath none’ ” and Hoddeson had received a $165 gift from her 
mother to indulge her desire to buy the furniture.107 Hoddeson 
took this gift money, and one morning, brought her aunt and four 
children to the store to make the furniture purchase.108 Instead of 
meeting with a salesperson, they encountered an ingenious impos-
tor carrying all sorts of airs of authority and the aura of belonging 
to the store.109
The court recounted that “[u]pon entering, she was greeted by 
a tall man with dark hair frosted at the temples and clad in a light 
gray suit.”110 The tall man “inquired if he could be of assistance”
and led Hoddeson and her “flock” to the display of the furniture 
that Hoddeson wanted.111 Next, he wrote down a calculation of the 
purchase price, $168.50, after which Hoddeson gave him cash, for 
which she did not ask for a receipt.112 This entire exchange took 
place over thirty to forty minutes.113 The tall man informed her that 
the furniture she had selected and purchased was not in stock and 
would be delivered to her the following month.114 Unfortunately 
for Hoddeson, the furniture would never arrive and the store 
claimed to have no record of the sale.115
In the aftermath, the store owners held fast to their assertion 
that the sale had been made by an impostor and not by one of 
their salesmen.116 In fact, the store paraded the salesmen in that 
department past Hoddeson and her aunt, in something like a po-
lice lineup, offering the “opportunity to gaze intently” at them.117
They were unable to definitively identify any of them as the afore-
mentioned “tall man” who took the money—and the one who 
came closest to suspicion had supposedly been on vacation during 
Hoddeson’s visit.118 All in all, however, the jury found that Hodde-
son “established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that 
the $168.50 was paid in fact to an employee of the defendant,” and 
the trial judge concluded that the evidence warranted such a find-
ing.119
107. Id. Though the court appears to set Hoddeson on a course where she could be 
made whole, the tone of the opinion could be characterized as disrespectful to the scam 
victim.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 703–04.
110. Id.





116. Id. at 704–05.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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On appeal, Koos Bros. argued that “there was a deficit of evi-
dence to support the conclusion that a relationship of master and 
servant existed between the man who served and received the 
money from Mrs. Hoddeson and the defendant company.”120 The 
court agreed with Koos Bros., finding that the plaintiffs had failed 
to allege and prove the existence of an agency relationship be-
tween the “tall man” and the store.121 Therefore, Hoddeson failed 
to allege that the “tall man” had express, implied, or actual author-
ity to establish privity of contract. The appellate court reversed the 
trial court on this point.122 “Assuredly, the law cannot permit ap-
parent authority to be established by the mere proof that a moun-
tebank [or ‘humbugger’] in fact exercised it.”123
For Hoddeson, however, all was not lost. Though the court re-
versed on the grounds prosecuted in assumpsit by the plaintiff, the 
court “recommended . . . the allowance of a new trial with the priv-
ilege accorded the plaintiff to reconstruct the architecture of [the] 
complaint”124 in order to plead “agency by estoppel” or “tortious 
dereliction of duty owed to an invited customer.”125 The court hy-
pothesized that if the facts were as alleged, “would the defendant 
be immune as a matter of law from liability for the plaintiffs’
loss?”126 The court answered with an approach that warrants some 
modern extension:
The tincture of estoppel that gives color to instances of ap-
parent authority might in the law operate likewise to pre-
clude a defendant’s denial of liability. . . . [W]e have in 
mind . . . the unique occurrences where solely through the 
lack of the proprietor’s reasonable surveillance and super-
vision an impostor falsely impersonates in the place of 
business an agent or servant of his.127
The court noted that a proprietor’s duties to customers “certain-
ly . . . encompass more than the diligent observance and removal 
of banana peels from the aisles.”128 Further, the court articulated a 
rationale for shifting the costs of deception from the consumer to 
the department store. “The rule that those who bargain without 
120. Id. at 705.
121. Id. at 705–06 .
122. Id. at 706.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 707.
125. See id. at 706–07.
126. Id. at 706.
127. Id. at 706–07.
128. Id.
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inquiry with an apparent agent do so at the risk and peril of an ab-
sence of the agent’s authority has a patently impracticable applica-
tion to the customers who patronize our modern department 
stores.”129 The court confronted the new landscape of the modern 
department store, recognized the possibility of newfound impostor 
scams, and put the burden on the department stores to absorb 
losses—thus, putting the incentives for mitigating this fraud into 
the laps of these stores.
Just as we note that new technologies and new consumption and 
payment mechanisms enable impostors today, in 1957 this court 
noted that “modern department stores,” presumably with their 
broad layouts, presented new challenges for consumers, who could 
be taken in by a “mountebank” roaming the floor in search of vul-
nerable customers.130 Indeed, the Hoddeson court observed that 
“old questions appear in new styles.”131 This case noted that such 
impostor occurrences had not been commonly reported in deci-
sions in the early half of the twentieth century, but had occurred 
nonetheless. Among them: impostors posing as hotel, railroad, and 
parking lot personnel, purporting to have the authority to hold 
guest, passenger, and automobile property for safekeeping.132
In these cases, the courts held accountable the entities whose 
personnel were impersonated for making the defrauded property 
owner whole. Given a choice between victims, the courts in essence 
lay the responsibility for exercising care at the feet of those who 
failed to exercise due care. The Hoddeson court left open the possi-
bility that the plaintiff herself could have been at fault, though on 
the known facts, that result would seem unlikely.
A few things about this previous generation of impostor tactics 
repeat with the problems of impostors today. First, these particular 
impostors had to operate in close quarters to the victims, of which 
there were two: the victim losing the money and the entity suffer-
ing from being impersonated. Certainly both Hoddeson and Koos 
Bros. were displeased with how events unfolded that day. Hodde-
son lost money and Koos Bros lost a sale to the same thief. So, who 
should bear the loss?
Data collected in the FTC Consumer Sentinel inform us that we 
may have turned the corner into a different landscape that re-
quires more emphasis on shifting the prevention burdens onto 
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 703.
132. See Kanelles v. Locke, 12 Ohio App. 210 (Ohio Ct. App. 1919) (impersonating a 
hotel clerk); Miltenberger v. Hulett, 175 S.W. 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) (impersonating rail-
road transfer agent); Luken v. Buckeye Parking Corp., 68 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) 
(impersonating parking lot attendant).
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those who are in a better position to mitigate impostor damage. 
The technology and payment mechanisms that have enabled im-
postors to increase their scale, and lower the costs and risks of op-
eration, are ultimately controlled by identifiable lower-cost avoid-
ers. For example, telecommunications providers have benefitted 
from technology that has lowered the costs of international out-
bound calling, and this has unwittingly, perhaps, enabled fraud. 
Popular payment mechanisms like gift cards have yielded benefits 
to retailers but have also presented impostors and scammers with a 
clean mechanism for stealing money from consumers. The means 
and locations for risky transactions have shifted, thus measures to 
address impostor fraud must shift. 
B. The Economics of “Modern” Impostor Scams 
Classic impostor scams operated successfully in a world where 
reaching victims at scale was expensive and often riskier. Technol-
ogy and the overall improved economics of imposture have recent-
ly driven an acceleration of the problem. But this “technology as 
accelerant” dynamic is nothing new. 
It did not take long for the criminally enterprising to figure out 
that a new invention called the telephone provided an opportunity 
to defraud people. The Patent Office attributes the 1876 telephone 
invention to Alexander Graham Bell.133 By 1878, the first telephone 
switching network had been deployed as a Bell franchise in Con-
necticut, with the publication of the first phone directory also fol-
lowing that year.134 As a Chicago police inspector observed in 1888, 
after pondering the aftermath of an early telephone scam, “The 
educated criminal skims the cream from every new invention, if he 
can make use of it.”135 The telephone was apparently no exception, 
and reports of telephone impostor fraud arrived almost within a 
decade of the invention. 
Though the means and methods involved physically comman-
deering a phone, the elements of a modern “grandparent”-type 
                                                   
 133. See Who Is Credited With Inventing the Telephone?, LIBR. OF CONG. (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/item/who-is-credited-with-inventing-the-
telephone/ [https://perma.cc/9MZ6-6BMP]. 
 134. Kat Eschner, The First Telephone Book Had Fifty Listings and No Numbers, SMITHSONIAN 
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/first-telephone-book-had-
fifty-listings-and-no-numbers-180962173/ [https://perma.cc/Q9NW-4A79]. 
 135. See Simon van Zuylen-Wood, How Robo-call Moguls Outwitted the Government and Com-
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hostage scam are all present in an 1888 account offered in the Elec-
trical Review.136 One weekday, a “smartly dressed” charlatan, who 
perhaps could be regarded as the Alexander Graham Bell of tele-
phone impostor fraud, knocked on the door of a prominent, well-
to-do trader.137 Introducing himself as “Thomas Jefferson Odell,”
he asked the butler if he could use “the house phone.”138 Some-
how, “Thomas Jefferson Odell” managed to rouse the trader on 
the phone at his place of business to inform him falsely that he had 
bound and gagged the cook, the chambermaid, and his wife.139
“Odell” demanded a ransom of $20,000 in cash, which the trader 
promptly sent to an accomplice in the scheme. Of course, the 
trader “rushed home to find his wife in fine shape and none the 
wiser.”140
The telephone-based impostor scam had arrived. The telephone 
offered a means to rapidly deliver a high-pressure, time-sensitive 
scam—with much of the concealment of any Spanish prisoner let-
ter scheme. Of course, the Thomas Jefferson Odell gambit de-
manded more risk and cost to the perpetrators, requiring at least 
two personal physical appearances to create the imposture. The 
target had to be carefully selected, and the execution had to be 
perfect, because the entire imposture, including the cash transfer, 
was happening right in Chicago, not originating from a distant 
country. As a scamming device for impostors, however, the exploi-
tation of the telephone would take some time—and additional 
technology—to reach a greater scale. In the time of Thomas Jeffer-
son Odell, not many people had phones, so accessing a phone by 
deceit would be accordingly difficult. As access to telephones in-
creased, and as calling became less expensive, the form of impos-
ture, as well as the method, changed. As payment transfer could be 
done from a distance, making the handoff less risky, imposture 
changed, too.
What happens when scammers take the power of the impostor 
and deploy wider-reaching, lower-cost technology that also enables 
them to remain at a distance? Robocalling has proven to be a pro-
lific means for spreading impostor scams. By one account, ro-
bocalls “have been around since at least the 1980s, when someone 






141. Alex W. Palmer, On the Trail of the Robocall King, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/on-the-trail-of-the-robocall-king/ [https://perma.cc/A96Z-
EULK].
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the 1983 movie WarGames revealed the way an enterprising teen-
age hacker could program his home computer to dial every phone 
number with a certain prefix until a modem answered.142 But deliv-
ering a message to recipients was more complicated in that analog 
time because “the hardware was clunky, expensive, and difficult to 
operate.”143 Audio cassettes, which carried and delivered the out-
bound messages, required rewinding after use and suffered from 
wear and tear.144 Of course, this all changed with the arrival of digi-
tal technology, which made robocalling substantially less expensive 
and easier to implement.145
The bombardment of preprogrammed unsolicited telephone 
calls, in an era before Caller Identification (Caller ID) and when 
people regularly answered their phones, led to a collective social 
outcry.146 Congress answered these complaints with a flurry of legis-
lation. Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings deemed robocalls “the 
scourge of modern civilization,” and apparently Americans con-
curred with the sentiment, “despite the competing scourges of 
war . . . or the spread of AIDS.”147 Senator Hollings, who co-
sponsored the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 
1991,148 lamented that these calls “wake us up in the morning, they 
interrupt our dinner at night, they force the sick and elderly out of 
bed, they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of 
the wall.”149 Bear in mind, Senator Hollings was ranting about ro-
bocalls long before scammers began to weaponize them by using 
the instrument of the robocall to defraud people out of their mon-
ey and, in some cases, jeopardize public safety by overwhelming 
telecommunications systems.150 As discussed later, much of the 
same sort of activity would eventually shift into email systems as 
that communications mechanism matured.
Scammers have uncovered the ability to mesh digital technology 
with automated telephone calling, enabling them to conduct scams
on a massive scale at a low expense. Thus, impostor scams are cost-
142. See WARGAMES (United Artists 1983).
143. Palmer, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Intruder on the Phone: Ending a Sales Talk Before It Begins, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/03/style/consumer-s-world-
intruder-on-the-phone-ending-a-sales-talk-before-it-begins.html [https://perma.cc/5KZW-
GJ3U] (as one telemarketing call recipient put it, telemarketing callers “are very consider-
ate, . . . [t]hey only call during the dinner hour when I am there”).
147. Palmer, supra note 141.
148. Pub. L. No. 102-243 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
149. 137 CONG. REC. 30821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
150. The FCC first became aware of the Adrian Abramovich robocalling scheme, dis-
cussed infra Section III.B, when a hospital network reported major disruptions of its paging 
system from floods of inbound phone calls.
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effective scams. Although policymakers and private entities cannot 
eliminate them, the ability to make impostor scams more expen-
sive and less effective could reduce their incidence. And a signifi-
cant portion of the ability to slow down and obstruct scammers 
must rest in the hands of private players, who ultimately control 
the means of communication and payment, either on their own 
accord to compete for customers or at the behest of lawmakers and 
regulators seeking to protect the public. Every solution and ob-
struction, of course, could be circumvented. But keeping private 
actors that often provide the tools that enable impostors, albeit un-
intentionally, at the forefront of prevention can help.
Telecommunications providers offer low-cost tools for impostors 
to reach an expansive field of targets, and with more reachable 
targets, more infliction of harm from fraud is inevitable. Perhaps 
regulators can require or encourage the providers of intermediary 
devices to take more responsibility for educating the public and 
their users about impostor fraud by offering more security and 
providing more disclosures.
III. FIGHTING IMPOSTOR SCAMS
Industry, lawmakers, and regulators have not sat on their hands 
while impostor fraud has grown. They have taken recent action to 
slow the roll of impostors, but the road ahead appears to be fairly 
bleak, even with measures and enforcement action already taken. 
Robocalling has been at the core of this scourge and addressing 
telephone scams has been a decades-long effort that continues to 
face new challenges. As noted, telephones are not the only mecha-
nisms for scammers to communicate with their victims, so even 
solving this problem only solves part of the problem.
How difficult is the robocall problem to solve? According to the 
CEO of YouMail, Alex Quilici, the telephone scam has taken the 
miracle of low-cost long-distance calling to realize a nightmarish 
promise of AT&T’s old advertising jingle that anyone can “reach 
out and touch someone.”151 YouMail provides robocaller blocking 
services.152 Quilici observes that “a 16-person call center in India 
can make $75,000 per day” and these call centers span the globe—
”from Florida to Guatemala to Nigeria to New Delhi to Philadelph-
151. See Linda Robertson, Block those Robocalls from Scammers and Unwanted Companies. 
Here’s How to Fight Back, MIA. HERALD (June 15, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/community/miami-dade/article231323738.html; see also AT&T, AT&T Reach 
Out and Touch Someone Commercial - 1987, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OapWdclVqEY [https://perma.cc/6JCN-TKRS].
152. Robertson, supra note 151.
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ia.”153 All it takes to get a robocall operation rolling is to “get four 
friends together in your apartment with a laptop and make mil-
lions of calls for nothing. There’s not a lot of overhead. Collect an 
average of $1 per robocall and your profit scales up pretty quick-
ly.”154 
Robocallers will often use inexpensive and easily accessible tele-
communications systems not just to reach people directly but also 
to exploit features like Caller ID to facilitate imposture. Scammers 
can operate from Guatemala, Nigeria, or Delhi and impersonate 
anyone. In other words, robocallers can make it appear that they 
are calling from a legitimate business, government agency, or a 
nearby location.155 
In Section III.A, I discuss at length the efforts to promulgate a 
regulatory solution through the telecommunications sector and in 
Section III.B, I describe some of the more aggressive enforcement 
actions taken against these fraudsters. As I observe in Section III.C, 
many involved in these efforts share pessimism about ultimately 
stopping impostor fraud, which is unsurprising given the capability 
of scammers to innovate. The policy goal, however, should be ori-
ented to make imposture less lucrative and as costly and risky as 
reasonably possible. 
A. Telecommunications Regulation 
The legislative and regulatory efforts to combat impostor fraud 
have focused on mitigation of the broader robocalling issue but 
have found limited success. These efforts have further focused on 
attempts to address the marriage of robocalling with manipulation 
of Caller ID information (also known as number “spoofing”). As 
scammers have moved on from using traditional telephone carri-
ers, the technological focus has shifted to this problem. Ultimately, 
if these problems are to be addressed, regulators and industry must 
collaborate proactively to stay ahead of scammers. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recog-
nized the trouble resulting from Caller ID spoofing which tricks 
call recipients into thinking scammers and other callers are some-
one who they are not.156 The FCC warns that “spoofing is often 
used as part of an attempt to trick someone into giving away valua-
                                                   
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Caller ID Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/
guides/spoofing-and-caller-id [https://perma.cc/9BVN-97EV]. 
 156. Id. 
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ble personal information so it can be used in fraudulent activi-
ty . . . .”157 The FTC has warned that “scammers are using fake caller 
ID information to trick you into thinking they are someone local, 
someone you trust – like a government agency or police depart-
ment, or a company you do business with . . . . One scammer re-
cently used the phone number of an FTC employee.”158 
FCC Chairman Ajit Pai “has made combatting unlawful robocalls 
and malicious caller ID spoofing his top consumer protection pri-
ority,”159 labeling them a “scourge.”160 In February 2019, the FCC 
released a report on robocalls and caller ID spoofing.161 The FCC 
noted that it has only recently begun to find effective means “to 
stem the tide” of robocalling by intervening with technology and 
changes in systems and promoting “aggressive enforcement ac-
tion.”162 
Starting in 2017, the FCC focused directly on the problem, pri-
oritizing putting a halt to “unwanted calls before they even reach 
consumers’ phones.”163 To begin to achieve these ends, the FCC 
“enabled voice service providers to block certain obviously-spoofed 
calls, authorized the creation of a reassigned numbers database so 
consumers do not get calls intended for others, and pushed the 
industry to implement Caller ID authentication, a key to stopping 
spoofing.”164 
As the FCC notes, however, not all robocalls are illegal.165 The 
task for policymakers is to prevent abuse of the telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, through illegal robocalls, to further curb im-
postor scams, while preserving avenues for legitimate automated 
calling. Several laws and rules prohibit the misuse of robocalling 
and Caller ID,166 but the effectiveness of their enforcement stands 
                                                   
 157. Id. 
 158. Andrew Johnson, Scammers Can Fake Caller ID Info, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May  
4, 2016), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2016/05/scammers-can-fake-caller-id-info 
[https://perma.cc/TUJ7-UXU6]. 
 159. The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-initiatives/fccs-push-combat-robocalls-spoofing [https:// 
perma.cc/68Q5-HUDU]. 
 160. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 17-59, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS 15 (2019), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/95RH-
VGYR]. 
 161. Id. at 1. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. The FCC elaborates, “Consumers frequently associate “robocalls” with annoying 
calls and, indeed, unwanted calls are a perennial top consumer complaint. . . . And yet the 
term “robocall” covers a wide array of calls, many of which are legal, such as school closing 
announcements and prescription or medical appointment reminders.” Id. 
 166. See id. at 2–3. 
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at odds with the recent growth of impostor scams that rely on ro-
bocalling, like tech scams. 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)167 and associ-
ated Delivery Restrictions rules168 serve to prohibit: 
[initiation of] any telephone call to any residential tele-
phone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliv-
er a message without the prior express consent of the called 
party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes, is 
made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States . . . . 169 
Many of the impostor scams use prerecorded voices to imper-
sonate authorities in order either to generate a return call or to 
draw the recipient to enter a phone tree leading them to an impos-
tor. The use of such mechanisms by impostors flagrantly violates 
this section of the TCPA and the accompanying FCC rules.170 
Similarly, scammers, particularly overseas scammers, appear un-
deterred by laws and rules serving similar protective purposes, like 
the Do Not Call Implementation Act,171 the Telemarketing Con-
sumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,172 and the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule.173 Those laws require telemarketers (although presum-
ably it only affects the telemarketers that care about compliance) 
to check the National Do Not Call Registry before dialing numbers 
and generally prohibit deceptive practices through telemarket-
ing.174 Like the TCPA, these laws were intended to rein in the nui-
sance and deceptive marketing abuses of those who solicit business 
through the telephone, but they primarily serve to reach violators 
within the realm and reach of domestic enforcement.175 Domesti-
cally, the fines and penalties for violating these laws and regula-
tions can be severe when directed against those within reach of en-
forcement. For example, the FTC sought to collect $280 million 
from DISH Network and its agents for “committing more than 65 
million violations of telemarketing statutes and regulations.”176 
                                                   
 167. 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 168. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2020). 
 169. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 
 170. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1) (2020) (prohibiting the initiation of “an automatic tele-
phone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” without consent). 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 6101. 
 172. Id. §§ 6101–6108. 
 173. 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2020). 
 174. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3. 
 175. See id. at 2–3. 
  176. United States v. DISH Network, LLC, 954 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. dis-
missed, 141 S.Ct. 729 (2021) (mem.). 
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When directed against the overseas operation that operates an im-
postor scheme on a massive scale, however, these laws and regula-
tions have no teeth.
The 2009 Truth in Caller ID Act177 (TCIDA) offers a direct tool 
for combating telephone harassment and imposture scam tactics.178
This tool only has teeth if policymakers direct resources toward en-
forcement, including overseas efforts to combat call spoofing. 
TCIDA “prohibits . . . provision of inaccurate caller identification 
information.”179 Specifically, it declares unlawful the practice of 
“causing any caller identification service to knowingly transmit mis-
leading or inaccurate caller identification information with the in-
tent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of val-
ue.”180
Presumably, this broad language incorporates prohibition of the 
abuse of newer technologies that have proliferated, like IP-enabled 
voice service.181 Many impostors use services like Skype to hide and 
spoof their identities.182 But again, like the other federal statutes 
and rules, TCIDA only serves a purpose if enforced.
The FCC has since moved beyond the enforcement of these 
statutes to look for other solutions to prevent or slow down the use 
of telecommunications systems as tools for impostor scams. As the 
report summarized, “the same characteristics that make robocalls 
appealing to businesses also make them appealing to scammers.”183
Robocalling “efficiently and cost-effectively” enables scammers and 
impostors to pull off their fraud.184 The FCC is well aware that im-
postor scammers “may not be deterred by the prospect of en-
forcement and may be especially difficult to locate.”185 As a result, 
the FCC “has focused on stopping illegal robocalls before they 
reach consumers’ phones.”186
The public may be fooled by impostor scammers because when 
called, they “may not have enough information to tell whether the 
call is wanted, unwanted, or illegal.”187 If they have Caller ID, the 
display may show a “spoofed” or a blocked number.188 The recipi-
177. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
178. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
180. Id. § 227(e)(1).
181. Id.
182. Samantha Murphy Kelley, The Frightening Future of Robocalls: Numbers and Voices You 
Know, CNN BUS. (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/06/tech/robocalls-scam-
voice/index.html [https://perma.cc/UA8M-MK7T].
183. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3.
184. Id. at 3–4.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
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ent of the call, if interested in figuring out who is trying to reach
them, must answer the call or let the caller leave a voicemail.189
Mitigating abusive spoofing of Caller ID calls for more than a 
statutory solution, and the FCC has taken note of collaboration be-
tween government and industry to stop the problem.190 The FCC 
has moved forward on several different fronts, which I will describe 
next, but still faces significant challenges in addressing impostor 
fraud, even with success on these fronts.191
The FCC has moved to expand the circumstances where voice 
service providers can engage in call blocking. The solution provid-
ed by this expansion, however, proves somewhat easy for the de-
termined impostor scammer to evade. In November 2017, the FCC 
“authorized providers to block Do Not Originate (DNO) calls”192
and calls originating from “invalid, unallocated, or unused” num-
bers.193 Service providers were able to block the spoofing of actual 
IRS phone numbers, which led to a dramatic reduction in scam 
complaints to the IRS.194 Ultimately, this provides an example of 
how impostor scammers can be slowed down by a move but not 
stopped. Impersonation of IRS personnel does not require a num-
ber associated with the IRS, though it certainly made the process 
easier for the scammers by lending credibility.
According to the FCC, voice service providers report “wide-
spread implementation of DNO blocking, and several . . . have im-
plemented or are implementing blocking of invalid, unallocated, 
and unused numbers.”195 The FCC, at long last in December 2018, 
adopted a rule to clarify that the wireless carriers could also take 
specific measures to block “robotexts” and other unwanted messag-
ing.196
The FCC also took note of the wave of private innovation that 
enables users to employ apps and other means of call blocking,197
observing that “[h]undreds of call-blocking apps have been devel-
oped for mobile telephones.”198 Some services block all calls that 
189. Id.
190. Id. at 7.
191. See id. at 6–14.
192. Id. at 7 n.37 (“Do Not Originate calls are calls made from a number that the sub-
scriber does not use to make outgoing calls and requests that calls purporting to originate 
from that number be blocked.”).
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 7 n.38. For a description of the immediate impact of this initiative, see FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE REPORT 1 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov
/cgb/Robocall-Strike-Force-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX4J-NHQD].
195. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 7.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Id.
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use Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) services,199 a favorite of 
scammers.200 For landline consumers, blocking services are offered 
by some carriers for a fee and by others for free. Consumers Un-
ion, the National Consumer Law Center, and the Consumer Fed-
eration of America have advocated that such services and tools 
should all be offered by providers for free.201 If voluntarily adopted, 
however, these tools will most likely be adopted by those already 
wise to the impostor scams. The adopters may be looking to stamp 
out the nuisance of these calls, but, as noted, there are other 
means by which scammers can defeat these safeguards.
In addition to their engagement on call blocking, voice service 
providers, with a bit of a push from the FCC, have made advance-
ments on Caller ID authentication.202 This technology could put 
another technological obstacle in front of impostor scammers. As 
the FCC notes, “[t]he benefits of authentication are substantial: 
consumers and voice service providers will know that callers are 
who they say they are, thereby reducing the risk of fraud and en-
suring that callers can be held accountable for their calls.”203 Au-
thentication could obstruct such pernicious practices as “neighbor 
spoofing,” which supposedly induces people to answer calls when a 
scammer spoofs a number that looks local, by using the same area 
code or prefix.204
A variety of private task forces and alliances have converged to 
develop a system that uses Caller ID authentication to stop impos-
tor calls from reaching the caller by “confirming that a call actually 
comes from the number displayed in the Caller ID.”205 It turns out 
a technological solution that uses a “framework of interconnected 
standards” may exist that might put a speed bump into scamming 
operations206 Appropriately, given the difficulty of weeding out 
these scammers, the framework has drawn upon the James Bond 
movie franchise for a name worthy of the role, “SHAKEN/STIR.”207
199. Id.
200. Catey Hill, Don’t Pick Up! This Is the No. 1 Time Scammers Are Calling You,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 18, 2018, 09:00 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/dont-pick-
up-this-is-the-no-1-time-scammers-are-calling-you-2017-11-22 [https://perma.cc/ZC3V-
A4HF] (Spamming technology “is cheap and easy to make thanks to Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP), which lets scammers make billions of automated calls”).
201. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 8 n.43.
202. See id. at 8–10.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Combating Spoofed Robocalls with Caller ID Authentication, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication [https://perma.cc/E7F5-F2NW].
207. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 9. Fictional spy hero James Bond always 
orders his martinis shaken, not stirred. Karen Kaplan, Docs Explain Why James Bond Prefers His 
Martinis ‘Shaken, not Stirred,’ L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.latimes.com
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“SHAKEN” stands for Signature-based Handling of Asserted In-
formation Using toKENs and “STIR” refers to the Secure Tele-
phone Identity Revisited standards.208
The approach, though not as deadly as a James Bond device, 
strengthens security protocols to enhance the likelihood that only 
identified phone numbers reach recipients.209 In essence, the pro-
tocol would only let calls through that meet the criteria for an elec-
tronic handshake. “Calls traveling through interconnected phone 
networks would have their Caller ID ‘signed’ as legitimate by origi-
nating carriers and validated by other carriers before reaching” re-
cipients.210 In other words, the SHAKEN/STIR framework “digitally 
validates the handoff of phone calls passing through the complex 
web of networks, allowing the phone company of the consumer re-
ceiving the call to verify that a call is in fact from the number dis-
played on Caller ID.”211
According to the FCC, “SHAKEN/STIR does not authenticate 
the content of the call, only the identity of the caller.”212 By “identi-
ty of the caller,” the FCC means the identity of the originating line. 
Presumably, a person could pick up a phone and make a call and 
pretend to be someone whom they are not and initiate a scam. 
Nonetheless, full implementation of SHAKEN/STIR would not on-
ly eliminate the nuisance of unlawful robocalls, but it would also 
create a significant hurdle for impostor scammers. The FCC set a 
goal to implement this system in 2019, relying on the cooperation 
of private industry groups and service providers.213 But rulemaking 
advanced through 2020.214 With the adoption of SHAKEN/STIR, 
the almost free and unfettered access to telephone call recipients 
would be removed as a device for scammers to use to reach large 
numbers of people. Or at least, until this system is defeated by oth-
er scammer methods, within telephony or without.
Indeed, Congress has recently made noise about robocalling, ul-
timately, moving forward with a display of bipartisanship. The 115th
Congress conducted three hearings between 2017 and 2019 about 
/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-james-bond-alcohol-shaken-not-stirred-20131212-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/RQF7-PHAW].
208. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 8.
209. See id. at 8–10.
210. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 206.
211. Id.
212. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 9.
213. Id. at 8–10.
214. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Mandates that Phone Companies 
Implement Caller ID Authentication to Combat Spoofed Robocalls (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363399A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYG8-
S59L].
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the robocall scourge and passed thirteen bills.215 In 2019, Congress 
finally enacted into law the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal 
Enforcement and Deterrence Act (the TRACED Act),216 which at-
tracted over eighty co-sponsors.217
The TRACED Act does not add much to the existing enforce-
ment frameworks, aside from enhanced penalties for robocal-
ling.218 But enhancing penalties will not likely deter those who per-
ceive no possibility of being caught, like overseas operators, or 
those with no assets, however.219 Apart from enhancing penalties,
the Act merely promotes the establishment of interagency working 
groups to study and report to Congress on the problem and ena-
bles the FCC to promulgate appropriate rules to accommodate 
SHAKEN/STIR.220
Cynically, one might conclude that the TRACED Act merely en-
ables authors, sponsors, and supporters to brag to constituents that 
they are working across the aisle to fight against a universally de-
tested and common practice, without accomplishing much. The 
substance of the TRACED Act brings to mind the admonition of 
two-time presidential candidate and businessman, H. Ross Perot:
“If you see a snake, just kill it—don’t appoint a committee on 
snakes.”221
Certainly, this legislation “appoint[s] a committee on snakes,”
while increasing the bounty on snakes. But can these snakes actual-
ly be killed? As the character Dr. Steven Price warned about snakes 
in the classic film Snakes on a Plane, “[m]ake it fast. Time is tis-
sue.”222 Observers have pointed out that “early iterations” of the 
technology needed to implement a plan like SHAKEN/STIR have 
215. Emily Birnbaum, Senate Passes Bill Penalizing Illegal Robcalls, THE HILL (May 23, 
2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/445255-senate-passes-bill-penalizing-illegal-
robocalls [https://perma.cc/Y46A-A43G].
216. Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019).
217. Birnbaum, supra note 215.
218. See Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deter-
rence Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 3, 133 Stat. 3274, 3274-76 (2019).
219. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 183 (1968) (The probability of prosecution for the overseas fraudsters might approach 
zero, so the “rational” fraudster would likely not be deterred much by any increase in penal-
ty).
220. S. 151 - Pallone-Thune TRACED Act, 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/151/ [https://perma.cc/DH7X-
ABGU].
221. Jessica Kwong, Ross Perot Quotes: Most Famous Lines from Former Third-party Presidential 
Candidate, NEWSWEEK (July 9, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/ross-perot-famous-quotes-
1448287 [https://perma.cc/YJ3S-K6RY].
222. SNAKES ON A PLANE (NEW LINE CINEMA 2006).
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been extant since 2006.223 Regulatory movement and enforcement 
have been slow to arrive, even as the menace has developed in the 
years since.
As the public sector regulates and enforces, and the private sec-
tor collaborates on enforcement, development, and implementa-
tion of technological solutions, many predict the scammers will 
adapt and innovate, and robocalls and their associated scams will 
continue.224 Any “committee on snakes” that produces a snake 
study would have to account for the evolutionary biology that will 
follow the first wave of diversion and killing of the snakes.
For example, some predict that scammers will defeat 
SHAKEN/STIR and other initiatives “by buying cheap, ‘legitimate’
United States-based numbers in the hundreds, maybe thousands,”
instead of spoofing them from abroad.225 Will an industry-
regulatory partnership be “nimble enough to catch spammers as 
they adapt”?226
Other observers believe that the FCC and other regulators must 
emerge as the leaders here, even though the telecom providers are 
closer to the technology and the fraud.227 This is because private 
telecom players lack a financial incentive to defeat robocalling 
scammers. Certainly, voice communication, though at the historic 
core of their offerings, does not project into their priorities for in-
novation. Voice calls “are dirt cheap” and not lucrative, for one 
thing.228 And no direct loss accrues to the telecom providers from 
these scams229 unless and until regulators put certain compliance 
onuses on them. After all, “why invest a lot of resources [into 
blocking robocalls] when “developing 5G networks” appears to be 
the next field for competitive investment? The providers will be 
less likely to invest in old technology unless given a push.
The flag-waving of the ninety-seven senators who voted for the 
TRACED Act may enable them to return home to brag about pass-
ing a law, but the act provides no real push besides an added 
measure of accountability for agency focus on the problem. If the 
robocalling snakes had a lobby, and could breathe sighs of relief, 
223. Editorial, You’re About to Get Fewer Robocalls. But Maybe Not for Long, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 




226. Jake Swearingen, Spam Robocalls Aren’t Slowing Down. Here’s the Tech that Could Stop 
Them, N.Y. MAG. (May 16, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/how-to-stop-
spam-robocalls-with-stir-shaken.html [https://perma.cc/56CZ-9FPA].
227. Editoral, supra note 223.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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their lobby would still breathe easily, even if the House of Repre-
sentatives passed this legislation and it was signed into law.
B. Enforcement Initiatives
The FCC and the FTC have taken a host of enforcement actions 
against violators of the aforementioned laws and regulations, but 
that does not seem to have stemmed the growth of impostor scams. 
Perhaps the growth continues because enforcement does not effec-
tively reach the overseas generators of impostor scams. It is worth 
noting the efforts because they are substantial, yet the incidence of 
these scams has continued to grow.
During the period between 2010 and 2018, the FCC “took en-
forcement actions involving proposed or imposed monetary forfei-
tures . . . against violators or apparent violators of either the Truth 
in Caller ID Act or the TCPA” that totaled nearly $250 million,230
reflecting 140 enforcement actions.231 Warning citations have also 
been issued to over three dozen violators.232 The FCC highlighted 
seven enforcement examples in their Robocall Report that appar-
ently typify the magnitude of the problem, but also highlight the 
limitations of their reach—they are all domestic examples.233
In one of the highlighted forfeiture cases, the one of the largest 
magnitude, a single person was held to account for launching a 
staggering “96 million illegal spoofed robocalls” over the course of 
three months, impostoring major hotel chains and online travel 
agencies, including Hilton, Marriott, Expedia, and TripAdvisor.234
Adrian Abramovich allegedly used robocalling and neighbor Caller 
ID spoofing tactics to induce people to hear a message falsely pur-
porting affiliation with legitimate travel companies.235 Through his 
network of Florida companies, he was directing calls to travel 
agencies that directed calls to Mexican call centers selling Mexican 
timeshares and vacation packages.236 For perspective, that amounts 
to twelve calls made per second,237 and, by one description, would 
230. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 10.
231. Id. at 11. A description of selected enforcement actions indicates that most of these 
actions pursued smaller fines. The Abramovich action described below accounts for $120 
million. Id.
232. Id. at 10.
233. See id. at 10–11.
234. Id. at 10.
235. In re Adrian Abramovich, Mktg. Strategy Lenders, Inc., & Mktg. Leaders, Inc., For-
feiture Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 4663, 4665 (May 10, 2018).
236. Id. at 4664.
237. Ethan Wolffe-Mann, How TripAdvisor Hunted a Robocaller that Made 100 Million Calls 
to Random People, YAHOO FIN. (June 27, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tripadvisor-
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qualify the perpetrator for the “Guinness World Record,” if there 
were such a thing, for robocalling.238
Note, however, that though part of the scheme took place out-
side the United States, the lead perpetrator, his entities, and assets, 
resided in Florida, which made enforcement easier. The FCC be-
gan investigating Abramovich due to complaints from a medical 
paging company about dangerous interference with their network 
from a massive onslaught of outbound calls.239 Not only was en-
forcement able to reach Abramovich at his actual front door, but
the United States Senate was also able to subpoena his appear-
ance.240 It is forgivable for the FCC to lead their reporting on en-
forcement with this massive and satisfying win, but this result may 
not typify the sort of enforcement actions that must be taken to 
shut down the robocalling and spoofing mechanisms.
Similar efforts have been made to bring enforcement actions 
against people and entities, all within jurisdictional reach. The 
FCC alleged that Philip Roesel, a resident of Wilmington, North 
Carolina,241 generated over twenty-one million robocalls, including 
eighty-two thousand spoofed calls, through his insurance market-
ing businesses during the period between October 2016 and Janu-
ary 2017.242
Roesel flooded recipients with these unlawful phone calls “in 
order to drum up sales of the health insurance policies he and his 
associated agents were selling.”243 His businesses had been set up to 
“generate leads for himself and other affiliated agents” for the sale 
of “health insurance products.”244 Roesel used false CallerID in-
formation to “avoid detection” and “evade law enforcement” and 
thus “make it more likely that unwitting consumers would answer 
the phone.”245 The impostor here deployed these tactics to achieve 
the ultimate goal of generating business. Ultimately, this typical 
scheme led to the FCC imposing an eighty-two million dollar pen-
hunted-robocaller-made-100-million-calls-random-people-124348420.html 
[https://perma.cc/PL8Y-U8PZ].
238. Rob Wile, Miami Man Made Nearly 100 Million Robocalls. Now He’s Paying a Big Price,
MIA. HERALD (May 11, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article210861109.html.
239. The FCC enjoyed extensive assistance from TripAdvisor, one of the companies im-
postored. See Palmer, supra note 141; In re Adrian Abramovich, 33 FCC Rcd. at 4664–65.
240. Palmer, supra note 141.
241. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Proposes $82 Million Fine for 
Spoofed Robocalls (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-82-million-
fine-spoofed-telemarketing-robocalls [https://perma.cc/G5E2-9G4W].
242. In re Best Ins. Contracts, Inc., & Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Ins. Quotes, Notice 
of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 33 FCC Rcd. 6403, 6403, 6414 (Sept. 26, 2018).
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. at 6–7, 9.
245. Id. at 9.
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alty on Roesel and his entities, an amount which he claimed he 
would have a great difficulty paying.246 Again, in this highlighted 
instance, the robocalling spoofer impostor was within reach of the 
authorities.
The third highest penalty in the report, thirty-seven million dol-
lars, was also levied against an alleged domestic offender, Afforda-
ble Enterprises of Arizona, LLC.247 Affordable Enterprises generat-
ed over two million robocalls through a telemarketing platform, 
more than thirty thousand of which the FCC verified to be 
spoofed.248 In this matter, a former employee of the entity, which 
marketed home remodeling and improvement services, blew the 
whistle on the operation to the FCC and revealed the inner work-
ings of the scheme.249
Affordable Enterprises purchased a list of home and cell phone 
numbers of individuals and called them, using the numbers from 
prepaid cell phones purchased at Walmart as the spoofed identi-
ty.250 A significant effort was made to conceal the identity of the 
calling entity in order to further the scheme. If call recipients 
called back to complain, the Affordable Enterprises employees had 
been instructed to pick up the phone to apologize and limit the 
conservations to minimize conflict.251 In addition, if a burner 
phone number generated too many complaints, the company 
would discard it.252 Consumers reported to the FCC that they had 
been ridiculed and harassed by some of the employees when re-
turning the calls and failed to receive identifying information 
about to whom the number belonged.253
This enterprise yielded remarkable financial success. The whis-
tleblowing employee reported that the center was generating 
$300,000 per month from these calls.254 This operation continued 
for well over a year, right in Tucson, Arizona. As with the Roesel 
matter, no evidence surfaced that the actual services being market-
ed were illegitimate, but the imposture was a key vehicle in getting 
leads.
These three operations represent the largest fines in the ro-
bocall cases highlighted by the FCC in its report. The other four 
246. Id. at 20–24.
247. In re Affordable Enters. of Ariz., LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 33 
FCC Rcd. 9233 (Sept. 26, 2018).
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id.
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actions listed in the FCC report involve penalties under three mil-
lion dollars, and a few well under that. They were all also domestic: 
a dialing technology and service platform, based in New Mexico;255 
a stalker and his co-worker, located in New York, making menacing 
and threatening phone calls to an ex-spouse;256 another travel mar-
keter located in Florida;257 and an Alabama bank.258 In total, the 
FCC reported only three enforcement actions in the robocalling 
report that involved imposture or spoofing, and all were domestic. 
Not to be outdone, the FTC and approximately two dozen state 
and local enforcement agencies “announced a major crackdown 
on illegal robocalls, including 94 actions targeting operations 
around the country.”259 The June 2019 initiative was deemed “Op-
eration Call it Quits.”260 The Operation Call it Quits complaints 
and actions were directed toward actors similar to the ones pur-
sued by the FCC. 
Among those in the net of Operation Call it Quits are alleged 
impostor scams, including a complaint against a “dial-
er”/“information technology guy” who supposedly used Caller ID 
spoofing as part of his services to other scammers.261 Another FTC 
target used a pre-recorded message pretending to be “John from 
the shipping department,” falsely informing call recipients “that a 
medical alert system had been purchased for them, and they could 
receive it ‘at no cost whatsoever.’ ”262 Although this operation skirt-
                                                   
 255. In re Dialing Servs., LLC, Forfeiture Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 6192 (July 26, 2017). 
 256. In re Steven Blumenstock & Gary Braver, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 
31 FCC Rcd. 8648 (Aug. 2, 2016). These individuals used a third-party spoofing service to 
modulate their voices, and the number appears to be from locations such as prisons. 
Though this use of imposture is highly disturbing and worthy of serious attention, this arti-
cle focuses on the use of imposture at higher volume for financial gain and to further swin-
dles. Id. 
 257. In re Travel Club Mktg., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8861 (11) (Aug. 11, 
2015). Note that imposture and caller identification spoofing did not appear to be involved 
in this scheme. At the time, this action held the record for the highest robocalling fine. 
Chris Morran, Travel Club Telemarketer Fined $2.96M for Robocalling Consumers, CONSUMERIST 
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://consumerist.com/2015/08/11/travel-club-telemarketer-fined-2-
96m-for-robocalling-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/E9HQ-NMMU]. 
 258. In re Sec. First of Ala., LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 2377 (Feb. 13, 2015) 
(also note that imposture was not part of this scheme). 
 259. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce New 
Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal [https:// 
perma.cc/WSU7-YA49]. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See Complaint, United States v. Derek James Bartoli, No. 19-1160 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 
2019); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce New 
Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal [https:// 
perma.cc/WSU7-YA49]. 
 262. Press Release, supra note 259; see also Stipulated Order Permanent Injunction and 
Monetary Judgment, FTC v. Lifewatch, No. 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2019). 
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ed the line of pure imposture, the operators falsely claimed prod-
uct endorsement from credible authorities “like the American 
Heart Association, American Diabetes Association, National Insti-
tute on Aging, or the AARP.”263 
FTC declared that these entities were “responsible for more than 
one billion calls pitching a variety of products and services includ-
ing credit card interest rate reduction services, money-making op-
portunities, and medical alert systems.”264 Just like the FCC actions, 
however, the targets, though significant, are all only within domes-
tic reach.265 Although the FTC and FCC appear to have overlapping 
missions and actions, both have enforcement authority. As one ob-
server put it, though there are certain “legal distinctions,” “the FTC 
is the sheriff here . . . prosecut[ing] shady business practices,” but 
“other state and federal agencies, including the [FCC], also police 
nuisance calls.”266 But as the FTC told one reporter, “there are 
enough violators in this space to keep us both busy.”267 
C. A Bleak Prognosis 
Jealousy of interagency authority does not appear to be the ob-
stacle to stopping impostor scams. The FTC has established en-
forcement operations and the FCC likely has closer familiarity with 
the technology.268 As the FTC staff attorney dedicated as the “point 
person on robocalls” explained, “the FTC is largely a civil law en-
forcement agency. We have a whole lot of attorneys, and a whole 
lot of economists, and a few technologists . . . we don’t have the 
expertise.”269 
Although all of these FCC, FTC, state, and local enforcement ac-
tions appear worthy of pursuit and resources, the massive problem 
of using telephone voice calls to achieve impostor scams is unlikely 
to be addressed this way. This leaves solving the problem to the 
technologists. Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey rec-
ognized the challenge of using domestic rules and law enforce-
ment. “There is a problem with a lot of these calls emanating from 
                                                   
 263. Press Release, supra note 259; Stipulated Order Permanent Injunction and Mone-
tary Judgment, FTC v. Lifewatch, No. 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2019). 
 264. Press Release, supra note 259. 
 265. Id. 
 266. van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 135. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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overseas, [thus] [t]he practicalities of enforcement become prob-
lematic.”270
The FCC concedes Attorney General Healey’s point at the end 
of its Report on Robocalls as one of its primary enforcement chal-
lenge. “Many illegal robocallers are operating in foreign countries. 
Although Congress recently gave the Commission express jurisdic-
tion over foreign Caller ID spoofers, in practice the Commission 
may also need cooperation from foreign governments.”271
Alex Quilici also offers some reasoned pessimism about regula-
tory and enforcement solutions to robocalls.272 (YouMail also pro-
vides a variety of blocking services for phone users, so his pessi-
mism may offer his business some grounds for optimism.)273 Quilici 
notes that “phone spam,” as he deems it, cannot be controlled as 
easily as “email spam.”274 Scammers have some fundamental ad-
vantages in telephony that they do not have in the email sphere, 
which can be better controlled through algorithms.275
For example, emails that are flagged as spam by email providers 
are still available if the recipient wants to safely inspect them, but 
they are separated from other messages and, therefore, suspicion is
heightened.276 There are no spam folders for storing phone calls, 
however.277 “Once the robocall is bounced at the network level, the 
consumer never sees it.”278 Phone service providers do not want to
inadvertently prevent a recipient from receiving a legitimate mes-
sage. Quilici added, “No carrier wants to make national news be-
cause grandma tried to reach her grandson to go to the hospital 
but her call was blocked. Robocall blocking is complicated. You
have to figure out if a number is misbehaving.”279
With telephone scams, Quilici observes that “the bad guys keep 
finding new ways and new numbers to lure you into answering the 
phone and falling for the scam. For them, it’s easy and cheap to 
operate, difficult to trace and extremely lucrative.”280 He notes that 
accessing the phone network, acquiring and disguising numbers, 
270. Elaine S. Povich, States Try to Silence Robocalls, but They’re Worse Than Ever, PEW 
STATELINE (July 25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2018/07/25/states-try-to-silence-robocalls-but-theyre-worse-than-ever [https://
perma.cc/C9N5-EXHU].
271. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 14.
272. See Robertson, supra note 151.
273. See YOUMAIL, https://www.youmail.com [https://perma.cc/S5KS-ERAU].
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and switching phone service providers can be done with ease.281
Although Quilici concedes that there will be some advancement in 
the blocking of illegal calls with new framework approaches like 
SHAKEN/STIR, “it won’t be a panacea. We’ve never seen regula-
tion solve technical problems.”282 Yet, he retains some measured 
optimism about robocalls: “Even though we’re at an all-time 
high . . . [and] the numbers may be creeping up a little bit . . . the 
situations seems to be mostly stable at this point. We have not 
turned the corner, but maybe the corner is in sight.”283
No miracles should be expected. The “[hope] that, ‘poof,’ ro-
bocalls will just be gone [is] the wrong mind-set,” according to a 
senior consultant at one of the industry standards bodies, but the 
systems are in place to bring the calls “down to a manageable lev-
el.”284
There have been some efforts to address the problem by attack-
ing call centers overseas that are operating full-on impostor 
scams.285 But the question will remain. The coordination of inter-
national law enforcement resources may be prioritized to focus on 
other areas of higher urgency and importance, like terrorism and 
human trafficking, rather than phone calls.
If the impracticalities of enforcement hold, the solution to curb-
ing modern impostor scamming lies in finding strategic ways to 
raise the risks and costs of scamming. This is best accomplished 
through the pursuit of proactive technological solutions that dis-
rupt the intermediary mechanisms for scamming on a large scale, 
through precisely targeted enforcement and education. Perhaps at 
some point, voice calling will not be trusted or might even be 
abandoned, as alternate means of popular communication take 
hold.286 Fewer people will answer telephone calls. But would that 
not simply shift the scammers to communications mediums that 
281. Id.
282. Id.




285. Though the efforts do not appear to be full scale, some overseas scams have been 
investigated and prosecuted. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Three Defendants 
and India-based Call Center Indicted in Phone Scam Targeting U.S. Victims (Mar. 12, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/three-defendants-and-india-based-call-center-
indicted-phone-scam-targeting-us-victims [https://perma.cc/Q7PS-SYAG]; Press Release,  
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Indian National Convicted of Role in Call Center Scam that Victimized 
Thousands in the U.S. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/indian-
national-convicted-role-call-center-scam-victimized-thousands-us [https://perma.cc/8CMY-
Z348].
286. See Newman, supra note 283 (“Much like the firehose of spam that made email al-
most unusable in the late 1990s, robocalls have made people in the US wary of picking up 
their cell phones and landlines.”).
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remain more trustworthy, like texting, social media, and other ap-
plications?
The robocalling “cat and mouse” game has not ended, and the 
people playing the role of cat seem to know that the mouse shall 
adapt and return.287 As noted, SHAKEN/STIR still allows the use of 
“legitimate phone numbers” for scams—it just will block spoofed 
ones from reaching their destination.288 The industry and FCC have 
expressed awareness that these changes will “inevitably spur crimi-
nal innovation in robocalling to evade or manipulate the new cryp-
tographic baseline.”289
In fact, Quilici points out that the improved ability to flag suspi-
cious calls by apps and providers has compelled an acceleration in 
the number of calls made.290 The robocallers need to make more 
phone calls in order to overwhelm those systems. “If you don’t an-
swer the phone, the robocaller has to work harder, so they gener-
ate more calls. It’s a death spiral.”291
And although the death spiral can be slowed down, the meshing 
of technology with the ability to impostor always returns. Ultimate-
ly, the determined and bold impostor scammer can accomplish 
seemingly anything, manipulating trust, authority, and fear and 
deploying technology in all sorts of ways. What amount of educa-
tion or technological advancement will stop modern-day Spanish 
prisoner scams, where the perpetrators are hiding overseas?
The approach that I propose suggests more concentrated ways 
to combat the impostor fraud problem. The efforts underway to 
address impostor scammers through telecommunications provide a 
starting point, but more than that, they provide an example of a 
pragmatic approach for slowing the roll of the basic scam. By forc-
ing scammers to resort to less-preferred means of communications, 
or to engage in the search for new means, the logistical difficulty of 
pulling off scams and the cost of executing scams should increase.
This would mean that the impostor scam might be less prevalent 
if the economics could be shifted back to resemble that of the 
scams embodied in the Spanish prisoner mailings and the salesper-
son imposture in Hoddeson. One way to achieve this would be to 
take a “least-cost avoider” approach toward these scam busting ef-
forts, putting to work those who operate and profit from offering 
the intermediary services that enable the fraudsters. They have the 
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more difficult. Certain industries can take voluntary measures to 
choke impostor fraud, and regulators and lawmakers can formally 
incentivize certain players to take action.
IV. FINDING THE RIGHT WARRIORS TO FIGHT IMPOSTOR FRAUD
Ultimately, a policy approach should aim to make impostor 
fraud riskier and more expensive. The scammer’s scheme in Hod-
deson v. Koos Brothers, though effective against both the consumer 
and the store, would be difficult to execute on mass scale without 
detection. Impostors thrive on concealment of identity and elud-
ing identification, and as noted, schemes like that one required 
more risk and could not operate at a scale like that of an operation 
that could leverage technologies like robocalling, ID spoofing, so-
cial media networks, or easily-accessible payment systems.
Regulators could require more vigilance from these chokepoint 
fraud intermediaries. Additional voluntary measures, if coordinat-
ed, might also help. Successful impostor fraud has always relied 
upon marrying emotions of fear and greed with the best and 
cheapest means for exploiting them. Those who straddle these 
“means” have the best knowledge of their mechanisms and the best 
opportunity to police their abuse. Many already have some incen-
tives to do so—a social media platform for dating, for example, al-
ready wants to avoid reputational damage from misuse, but per-
haps these sorts of entities can absorb more burden. They are 
classic examples of least-cost avoiders for preventing this social 
harm.
A. Finding the Least-Cost Avoiders
A least-cost avoider approach would focus on ensuring that 
those entities that engage in activities that yield a harm absorb the 
cost of that harm. This would compel entities to internalize the 
harm in a way that would motivate them to manage and contend 
with these costs.292 A least-cost avoider mindset can help policy-
makers design the most efficient system and framework for com-
bating impostors, making their scams more difficult to execute. A 
framework that assigns a duty to the intermediaries and owners of 
instrumentalities who benefit from providing these services to the 
292. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (an embryonic discussion of the implications of least-cost avoidance 
principles).
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public would be justifiable from a distributive standpoint and effi-
ciency standpoint.293 That is, those who profit from offering a ser-
vice should internalize more costs and thus more burdens.
Summarizing the vast literature that explains and applies the 
least-cost avoider (LCA) concept proves challenging, but a revisit 
of the basics offers worthwhile context. As Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed summarized Justice Holmes, “[p]erhaps the 
simplest reason for a particular entitlement is to minimize the ad-
ministrative costs of enforcement,” unless shifting the burden im-
proves welfare.294 Allowing the costs of impostor fraud to fall where 
they lie would be certainly the most inexpensive system to adminis-
ter. Calabresi and Melamed observed the social problem that fol-
lows from only applying this “simplest reason,” concluding that 
minimizing administration “by itself . . . will never justify any result 
except that of letting the stronger win.”295
Aside from the scattered enforcement measures discussed above, 
letting the costs of impostor fraud fall where they lie seems to be 
the dominant system in place, and that approach has apparently 
enabled impostor fraud to flourish. In our current system, victims 
of impostor fraud appear to bear most costs. Scammers, by and 
large, seem to be beyond the reach of the system, and intermediar-
ies bear little burden.
Famously, Calabresi and Melamed laid out the premise of the
least-cost avoider (LCA), which has been much discussed over the 
past half-century. An LCA-themed framework could lead to the 
most efficient solution to minimize the impact of impostor fraud 
and other associated problems. As they wrote, “economic efficiency 
standing alone would dictate that set of entitlements which favors 
knowledgeable choices between social benefits and the social costs 
of obtaining them, and between social costs and the social costs of 
avoiding them.”296 They suggest “the cost should be put on the par-
ty or activity best located to make such a cost-benefit analysis.”297
Are consumers the LCAs here or are the intermediaries the 
LCAs? The operators of intermediaries have technological capabil-
ities and a centralized knowledge base that the potential targets do
not have. Scammers are able to study and exploit these systems and 
293. See generally Benjamin Edelman, Least-Cost Avoiders in Online Fraud and Abuse, 8 SEC.
& PRIV. ECON. 78 (2010) (discussing the roles that the Communications Decency Act and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act play in involving intermediaries in policing defama-
tion and copyright violations, respectively).
294. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1096.
297. Id.
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experiment with using them to their ends. These intermediaries 
are better positioned, as repeat players, to create and mine their 
own knowledge base about how scammers use their platform and 
to develop and implement approaches to fight impostors. Scam-
mers have asymmetric information relative to consumers about 
how to exploit these systems and the intermediaries have the best 
means for leveling out these advantages. Consumers do not work 
full time to detect scams and even if they are able to avoid some of 
them with common sense, this Article has documented that some 
impostors are sophisticated enough to deceive anyone. Therefore, 
attempting to induce stronger consumer detection efforts through 
liability assignment is unlikely to alter the frequency of impostor
fraud significantly.
Unsurprisingly, and perhaps reflecting these observations, pro-
posals have been made to apply these LCA principles to address 
the slightly different scourge of identity theft, which can play a role 
in impostor fraud. Again, impostor fraud focuses on the impact on 
those who have been deceived by false identity, whereas identity 
theft focuses on the impact on those who have had their identities 
stolen. In 2004, Jeff Sovern suggested that the burden should be 
shifted from consumers to creditors, and the credit bureaus should 
absorb losses.298 He identified the “credit industry” as the LCA of 
identity theft and suggested that if they bore the costs, they would 
have more of an incentive to combat this social problem.299 Over a 
decade later, Mark Geistfeld recognized that private tort law alone 
would be insufficient to address the identity theft problem, even 
with the application of strict liability principles.300 Geistfeld con-
cluded that such an approach to identity theft could “only com-
plement other regulatory efforts.”301 Because the operators of in-
termediaries may not be sufficiently internalizing the costs of 
fraud, market forces will not solve this growing impostor scam 
problem unless some burdens are shifted. Ordinarily, one might 
ask what the optimal level of impostor fraud might be—that is, 
what level of fraud might be tolerable in the aggregate? For now, 
the concern can be leveled at the mere growth of impostor fraud 
over time, both in terms of incidence and magnitude of losses.
With impostor fraud, the problem may be broader and require 
more of a coordinated regulatory attack than identity fraud. Im-
postor fraud has many more chokepoints. In essence, the credit 
298. Jeff Sovern, Stopping Identity Theft, 38 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 233 (2004).
299. See id.
300. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted to Others in Business 
Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Tort Liability, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (2017).
301. Id. at 412.
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industry is the “chokepoint” for much of identity fraud, maintain-
ing the ability to manage and verify credit and identity infor-
mation, while financially benefiting from lending and maintaining 
this data. The chokepoints for impostor fraud are broader and 
cross multiple sectors of the economy, as well as emerging tech-
nologies.
Impostor fraud should be treated as a byproduct of the profita-
ble activity of providing telecommunications services, social media 
services, or stored-value money cards. All of those create social val-
ue, but can also produce a destructive social byproduct akin to “ac-
cidents or pollution.”302 “The costs should be put on the party or 
activity which can, with the lowest transaction costs act in the mar-
ket to correct an error in entitlements by inducing the party who 
can avoid social costs most cheaply to do so.”303 There are measures 
that intermediaries and instrumentalities can take to avoid social 
costs, and given their knowledge of technology and repeat-player 
wisdom, they may be in the LCA position.
Of course, macro decisions need to be made about how much to 
economically burden these intermediaries, much in the same 
manner that decisions were made about how much to burden (or 
unburden) information and content distribution intermediaries. 
The model does not mesh perfectly with the classic Calabresi-
Melamed application to accidents, in that we are not addressing a 
problem of legitimate operators engaging in risky activities. But 
this impostor problem may call for an approach “in which the 
permitted level and manner of accident-causing activities is deter-
mined collectively,”304 if one can define an incident of impostor 
fraud as an “accident” that can spill over from the activity of 
providing an infrastructure for communication or money transfer. 
Although only one “avoider” can truly qualify as the “least” of the 
LCAs, a few contenders emerge.
B. Shifting Burdens to Communications Intermediaries and 
Payment Systems
To address impostor fraud, policymakers and regulators can al-
locate more responsibility to providers of telecommunications ser-
vices, social media services, and stored-value card offerors for ab-
sorbing the costs of impostor fraud.305 Regulators and lawmakers 
302. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 294, at 1096–97.
303. Id. at 1097.
304. Id. at 1097 n.19.
305. Such measures do not preclude self-regulation.
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can mandate adoption of certain technologies, mandate disclosure 
of warnings (akin to safety warnings), or otherwise place re-
strictions on their business practices to decrease the incidence of 
impostor fraud. Of course, many instrumentalities and intermedi-
aries can be used to perpetrate impostor fraud, but these services 
appear to be among those strategically positioned to intervene if 
required, or otherwise incentivized, to do so. Fraudulent innova-
tion can never be squelched, given the opportunities and potential 
payoffs to scammers, but an LCA approach demonstrates that 
more care can be taken by the entities that economically benefit 
from these systems. As controllers of key chokepoints, however, 
these sectors are in a superior position to block or intervene in 
fraud than the intended victims. Having perhaps greater 
knowledge about these scams, their fraud reporting obligations 
should also be stronger, as they can better alert both regulators 
and citizens.306
1. Telecommunications Carriers
The push from lawmakers, regulators, and enforcement to pres-
sure telecommunications-carrier intermediaries to solve this prob-
lem has been a focus for those who have studied the evolving ro-
bocall problem for several years.307 Mass impostor scams rely on a 
“ ‘chokepoint’ in which illegal conduct may be cut-off and de-
terred.”308 Applying pressure at this chokepoint will raise the costs 
of enacting such prolific impostor scams but will require both gov-
ernment intervention and incentives for industry innovation and
cooperation.
In 2014, the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies (ICAS) 
published an extensive and thorough report assessing the state of 
TCPA effectiveness, suggesting “certain modifications and im-
provements” to the 1991 statute in the wake of technological and 
other developments in the years since passage.309 Spencer Weber 
Waller and the co-authors of this report recognized the difficult 
challenges of enforcement in the wake of evolving technology.310
306. See generally David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 45 (2007) (proposing leveraging fraud reporting in a way that adapts to new scams).
307. Spencer Weber Waller, Daniel Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, Loyola U. Chi. Sch. L., 
Inst. for Consumer Antitrust Stud., The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting 
Consumer Protection to Changing Technology 61 (Loyola U. Chi. Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory 
Rsch. Paper No. 2013-016, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2327266 [https://perma.cc/JB54-RT54].
308. Id. at 60.
309. Id. at 4–6.
310. See id. at 36.
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Prior to the current impostor scam proliferation, they observed the 
futility of stopping “calls . . . routed through a ‘web of automatic 
dialers, caller ID spoofing, and [voIP] protocols.’ ”311 They recog-
nized that the TCPA’s effectiveness depended on the robust use of 
the “private right of action”312—not public enforcement.313
The ICAS report observed that the private right of action would 
provide little incentive for private actors to pursue and deter “in-
tentional violators” like the impostor-scam perpetrators of concern 
here, as they were designed to deter “otherwise legitimate compa-
nies.”314 Further, “when TCPA violators are located overseas or are 
judgment proof, there is little incentive for an individual or class of 
private plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit. The effort becomes futile when the 
violator cannot even be located.”315 As noted, “companies that are in-
creasingly responsible for the majority of TCPA violations are lo-
cated overseas,”316 where many of the impostor scams originate,
true to their Spanish prisoner heritage.
Though the ICAS report makes many recommendations, for ex-
ample, to redouble efforts to stop unlawful Caller ID manipula-
tion,317 ultimately, the report recognizes that these recommenda-
tions cannot effectively address overseas-operated impostor fraud 
that already violates the law. “Government enforcement is neces-
sary. Private parties do not possess the resources or the incentive to 
track and locate entities located outside the United States.”318
Given the weakness of laws on the books, including the toothless 
recently-enacted TRACED Act and the chokepoint position of tele-
communications providers, carriers should carry more of a burden 
as a potential LCA of impostor fraud. The available technology to 
verify caller identity has evolved to a point where carriers are able 
to make massive calling more difficult and expensive—and more 
innovative. The more expensive the generation of impostor scam 
calls is to impostors, the fewer calls there will be. These calls are an 
externality absorbed by consumer subscribers that result from con-
sumers using the services, and consumer use benefits the carriers. 
Although some consumers can and do avoid the scourge, the own-
er and controller of the chokepoint and its technology can more 
easily perform the choking.
311. Id.
312. Id. The TPCA enables private plaintiffs to sue for $500 for each separate violation 
and $1,500 if the violation is willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3), (f)(1).
313. See Waller et al., supra note 307, at 36.
314. Id. at 37.
315. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 45.
317. Id. at 60.
318. Id. at 45.
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Even if only some impostor scams can be choked, the technologi-
cal mass production of outbound calls could be slowed down. If 
policymakers design and enforce legislation and regulation to in-
centivize carriers, and carriers innovate and demonstrate proactivi-
ty, impostor phone calls should diminish. Of course, if robocalls 
start to stop, more people might regain trust in inbound phone 
calls, more calls might be answered because recipients could let 
their guard down, and a new, different wave of imposture could 
begin via the same telecommunications systems. As previously not-
ed, if the industry follows through on SHAKEN/STIR in some ver-
sion, there are already means for scammers to defeat this system by 
buying identifiable phone numbers that enable scammers to con-
tinue to robocall. Lawmakers, regulators, and the private sector 
must always try to maintain tabs on how scammers abuse technolo-
gy. If the gatekeepers stand still, the costs of imposture will drop 
again, and it will reemerge. In fact, they must make all efforts to 
stay ahead of the scammers and not rest on the recent regulatory 
innovations and technological gains.. Once again, the telecom sec-
tor, having access to how their technology is abused, are in an LCA 
position and responsibility should be shifted accordingly.
Right now, it is worth asking whether executing something like a 
“grandparent scam” by telephone would still be possible, even after 
SHAKEN/STIR. Certainly, as the way things are, scammers could 
use burner phones, and possibly even spoof them to present num-
bers that pretend to be a hospital or law enforcement. Tightening 
regulation on the sale of burner phones, particularly when pur-
chased in bulk, might solve this problem, but, certainly, scammers 
can find other, perhaps less easy, means. Email spoofing could still 
be used if the scammer skims information from social media. But 
such measures by scammers require more skill and expense to exe-
cute, so one would expect fewer grandparent scams. The IRS and 
Social Security scams in their current forms, however, could be 
significantly slowed down, as could the widespread scourge of im-
posture of hospitality providers through blast systems.
Given that impostor scam reports now exceed identity theft 
scams on the FTC Sentinel report, pushing the LCAs to mitigate 
high-volume generation of impostor calls would have an outsized 
impact, at least in the near term. Unfortunately, this approach 
alone would not be enough to put a permanent dent in the prob-
lem. For example, another medium used to exploit people 
through imposture, email and social media, will be explored in the 
next subsection, and none of the above telecommunications efforts 
address that potential chokepoint.
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2. Social Media and Email Systems
Social media platforms and email systems provide ample oppor-
tunities for scammers to pretend that they are someone they are 
not. Social media impostor scams are distinct from basic email im-
postor scams. For contrast, in a pure email “phishing” scam, a 
scammer can scour organizational websites for organizational hier-
archies, scan or scrape email addresses, and discern supervisor and 
colleague relationships.319 They can easily create an email account 
that spoofs a supervisor, for example, to impersonate and scam 
subordinates and colleagues with an urgent plea to help them out 
of a temporary cash fix.320 (After all, a “boss” needs to be accom-
modated and can always be trusted to pay the money back.) A few 
primary ways to address these scams right now are to educate peo-
ple in organizations about phishing and apply pressure on the 
“payment” chokepoint.
Straight-up email scams present a problem, but social media 
platforms afford certain scammers with even more high-powered 
tools for imposture, including the ability to create a false persona 
or impersonate a real person, establish a long-distance relationship 
(often with the promise of romance), and manipulate targets into 
handing them their money. The elements of the basic Spanish 
prisoner routine are present. There is an emotional appeal, per-
haps a deeper one here that takes longer to cultivate.321 The scam-
mers can launch their entire scam from overseas, in countries 
where enforcement and tracking would be almost impossible.322
The payment systems involved are easy to manipulate323 and, under 
the right circumstances, a scammer can score a significant amount 
of money from victims.324




321. See generally Romance Scams: Online Impostors Break Hearts and Bank Accounts, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/romance-scams 
[https://perma.cc/Q264-JVJ6].
322. See generally id. (for example, two Nigerian nationals pleaded guilty in U.S. federal 
court to participating in an elaborate romance scam scheme, but at least one of the perpe-
trators remains at large).
323. See generally Online Dating Scams Infographic, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO.
(Feb. 2020), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0560-online-dating-scams-infographic 
[https://perma.cc/Z77M-4M4V] (warning against wiring money, using or sending gift or 
reloadable cash cards, or sending cash to previously-unknown people who “profess love 
quickly” online).
324. See generally FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, supra note 321 (scammers in this case ex-
tracted at least $2 million from one victim).
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If the scammers are beyond the reach of recovery, who should 
bear the cost of the scam? The victims bear some personal respon-
sibility, but they are often the targets of masterful schemes of ma-
nipulation, facilitated by the vehicles of social media that enable 
scammers to gather personal information from targets and create 
realistic-looking impostor profiles. The New York Times profiled a 
common version of the romance scam, where the scammer used 
the unique tools provided by Facebook as the means for generat-
ing a false romantic connection.325 This scam drew upon the im-
posture of real military personnel through the misappropriation of 
their likeness and creation of their own narrative.326
Congressman Adam Kinzinger, himself a repeated victim of 
identity spoofing, followed up after the Times story with a letter to 
Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg, asking him to 
provide extensive information about Facebook’s identity security 
problems and the magnitude of efforts to prevent scammers from 
using their tools.327 Although Kinzinger has yet to craft legislation 
to address this problem, he suggests that Facebook consider means 
of user identity authentication, such as using facial recognition 
technology or other proof of identification to establish or retain an 
account.328
As Facebook starts to explore developing its own cryptocurrency 
and confronts accompanying regulatory concerns on that front, 
they may need to take more measures to mitigate damage from 
scams perpetrated through their platform.329 The marriage of a 
platform that manages both identities and currency transactions
could prove to be an even more potent tool for scammers if ap-
propriate measures are not taken to mitigate risk.
Facebook may be an example of an LCA in that they control the 
gate to those who use their platforms. They already exercise the 
power to ban real people from using their services, and they have 
more information and resources to verify accounts than their us-
325. See Jack Nicas, Facebook Connected Her to a Tattooed Soldier in Iraq. Or So She Thought,
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/technology/
facebook-military-scam.html [https://perma.cc/WL7J-W8NJ].
326. See id.
327. See Jack Nicas, Another Victim in Facebook Romance Scams: A U.S. Congressman, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/technology/facebook-
military-romance-scam.html [https://perma.cc/XH3F-FFZF] (describing Rep. Kinzinger’s
frustrations in dealing with impostor scams over several years and stories about the victims 
who were deceived by the imposture of his identity); Letter from Adam Kinzinger, Member 
of Cong., to Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman, CEO, Facebook, Inc. (July 31, 2019), 
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1544-kinzinger-letter-to-zuckerberg/
553570d65fe47a065b04/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/KH6S-4NFR].
328. See Nicas, supra note 327.
329. Id.
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ers.330 Perhaps more verification could be required, even if it slows 
down platform entry and causes users to balk due to extra privacy 
concerns. These capabilites leave Facebook in the best position to 
internalize the costs of mitigating the risks of imposture on their 
platform. Of course, if Facebook becomes safer, the scammers will 
flee elsewhere. It is more expensive, however, for scammers to 
move away from safer, popular platforms to darker corners of the 
Internet where achieving scale is more difficult. Given this in-
creased cost, the marginal impostor will no longer find it profitable 
to conduct scams, and thus the total number of impostor scams 
will decrease, at least temporarily. Additionally, if Facebook truly 
becomes safer, the public may place less trust in platforms that 
cannot verify user identity, incentivizing all of these platforms to be 
safer from fraud.
Naturally, dating-service sites and apps have become attractive 
hosts for impostor scammers. By 2015, Pew reported that nearly 15 
percent of American adults reported using dating sites or apps.331
Just in the prior two years, usage had been increasing substantially 
across age demographics.332 At the very least, platforms should bear 
the costs of enhanced verification, additional education, and warn-
ings for users to prevent impostors from using a false identity to 
create the appearance of a romantic interest333 that will convince 
the target to send money to them.334 Dating sites, like the prolifera-
tion of automated telephone technology, have enabled scammers 
to operate inexpensively, at scale, and at a safe distance. Before the 
advent of internet technology and social media, romance scam-
mers would have to try to pull off these schemes in person.335
330. Todd Haselton, Facebook Content that Gets You Banned According to Community Stand-
ards, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/facebook-content-that-
gets-you-banned-according-to-community-standards.html [https://perma.cc/9MPS-FBXG].
331. Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Dating 




333. In this context, this is known as “catfishing.” See Catfishing, URB. DICTIONARY,
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Catfishing [https://perma.cc/E6FV-
K73B].
334. For an example of warnings about these scams and safety recommendations, see
Lisa Copeland, 9 Tips to Keep You Safe from the Scammers on Online Dating Sites, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/online-dating-scammers-
tips_b_6594250 [https://perma.cc/2LEE-G8SJ] (tips from a dating coach for identifying 
such scams and taking precautions to avoid them).
335. Apparently, they still do. The elderly appear to provide targets for cruel, in-person, 
versions of these scams, though not all of them conceal identity, just true motive. See Pam 
Zekman, 2 Investigators: Sham Marriage Drains Elderly Man’s Savings, CBS CHI. (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/11/18/2-investigators-sham-marriage-drains-elderly-
mans-savings/ [https://perma.cc/3FW2-SGBD].
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Again, scammers have always seemed to find avenues to exploit 
all forms of technology, as it lowers the cost of imposture. This puts 
more pressure on private and public actors to raise scam execution 
costs. Social media and dating site providers are custodians of 
identity and connection, and thus maintain an LCA status, carrying 
some means of putting on the brakes and raising the costs of im-
posture. Placing direct financial liability on these sites may prove 
impractical. But incentivizing platforms to make changes that pro-
tect users, either through required safety warnings and verification 
procedures when using the service, or through altruistically-
inspired enhancement of voluntary measures already taken, could 
prove socially fruitful and enhance welfare.
Further, all of these scams can be defanged somewhat if fund 
transfer becomes more challenging for the scammers to realize. If 
scammers cannot get paid, or if it becomes more difficult to get 
paid, they will have to look for other, less convenient, means of ac-
quiring cash. For example, after fraudulently creating a romantic 
attachment through a fake identity on a dating site, the scammer 
can fake a need for quick cash and can motivate those who trust 
him to resort to unconventional means of transferring money to 
him. With romance scams, as with all other impostor scams, money 
can flow through devices like gift cards, reloadable stored value 
cards, mobile payment services, or classic wire-transfer services. 
Next, I discuss how pressure has begun to be applied, and could be 
further placed, on these types of financial intermediaries to raise 
the cost of perpetrating impostor fraud.
3. Payment Mechanisms
Of course, if scammers cannot get paid, or paid easily, their mo-
tivation will evaporate. Ultimately, nothing can stop scammers 
from inducing victims from sending dollar bills through the mail 
except the inconvenience and suspicion that may be raised from 
doing so. Thus, wire service providers, including banks and entities 
like Western Union, should enhance their warnings about impos-
tors. For example, banks can warn customers about impostor fraud 
during the mortgage lending escrow process, telling them to be 
vigilant about directing wire transfers.336
336. See Aly J. Yale, Real Estate Wire Fraud Is Real—And It Almost Happened to Me, FORBES
(May 7, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alyyale/2019/05/07/real-estate-wire-fraud-is-
real-and-it-almost-happened-to-me/#dabb2781c47a [https://perma.cc/FK2X-6PQR] (de-
scribing how this type of scheme works).
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With respect to identity theft through credit and debit cards, 
federal law shifts the weight of heavy losses to the financial institu-
tions with a cap on consumer exposure.337 By pushing more of the 
responsibility onto the financial institutions, both the consumer 
and the financial institution bear some incentive to take measures 
to avoid fraud. Credit card charges can be canceled if the mark be-
comes aware of the fraud, depriving the scammer of the payment 
making this payment system less ideal than other alternatives.
In recent years, impostor scammers have increasingly asked vic-
tims to use stored-value cards (gift cards) to enable easy and un-
traceable methods of transferring money.338 The FTC reports that 
the number of victims reporting use of these gift cards rose 270 
percent between 2015 and 2018.339 Gift and reloadable cards be-
came the most common method of money transfer between victim 
and scammer, a match with the dynamic of impostor fraud becom-
ing the most frequently reported scam. As with many steps in the 
impostor scamming chain, there are chokepoints for financial 
transfers that regulators and merchants can use to slow fraud.
The FTC reports that “scammers are telling people to buy gift 
cards at Walmart, Target, CVS, Walgreens, and other retail 
shops.”340 Forty-two percent of victims have used Google Play and 
iTunes cards for their payment.341 Retailers have the opportunity at 
purchase to warn their customers about these scams. They can stop 
shoppers who buy cards, or a certain dollar amount of these cards, 
and warn them to be vigilant about scams. Customers can be re-
quired to sign electronic disclosures at the point of sale that can 
warn of the traditional and most recent flavors of scams. Further, 
providers of stored-value cards, like Google Play and iTunes, can 
take a role in warning users about how they can be vehicles for 
theft and deceit. Perhaps a twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour cooling 
off period before stored-value card usage would enable some time 
for consumers to figure out what may be happening. Although no 
degree of warnings may dissuade an overly stressed consumer from 
transferring money to a scammer, education, forced caution, and 
337. The Fair Credit Billing Act caps consumer exposure to unauthorized credit card 
use and charges to $50 if reported in a timely way. 41 U.S.C. § 1643. The Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act provides a similar structure of caps for ATM and debit card consumer liability 
for unauthorized use with some burden on the user for disclosure. Id. § 1693.
338. See Cristina Miranda, Scammers Demand Gift Cards, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER 
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deliberation may diminish the utility of these instruments to im-
postors.
The cutting edge of payment systems also warrants monitoring. 
The Fintech sector has enabled banks and credit card companies 
to enable person-to-person money transfers, which may also pre-
sent novel technical challenges for consumers.342 Finance entities 
using these applications, as well as their regulators, should pro-
mote consumer vigilance about transferring payments to people 
they might not know, and offer verification services that will make 
imposture difficult through these emergent technologies. As with 
other chokepoints, consumer education, mandatory warnings, and 
user verification can play a constructive role. Though these tools 
may be new, as explained here at length, imposture is an estab-
lished phenomenon hungry for new tools.
As with other tools exploited by fraudsters, the financial transfer 
chokepoint presents an opportunity to slow down impostors—to 
prevent them from achieving their payday at the very last step. Sim-
ilarly, citizens, policymakers, and the financial sector must be vigi-
lant about how impostors can abuse technical advances in this in-
novative arena. Those who commercially benefit from this 
technology and these systems are closest to the potential solutions 
to impostor fraud at this crucial juncture.
CONCLUSION
Fraud is an old problem, and impostor fraud is not only persis-
tent but also prevalent as a social and economic scourge. The justi-
fication for fighting this type of fraud has never been higher, given 
that the systems that impostors can appropriate and exploit have 
never been more efficient and effective for them. Policymakers 
should constantly scan the horizon to see how these scammers are 
succeeding, identify the least-cost avoider chokepoints for this 
fraud, and apply pressure. Given the tremendous power that im-
postor fraud has, the only prescriptions for slowing it down are vig-
ilance and being as innovative as the fraudsters. To do any less will 
only encourage the problem to expand.
342. See Erin Fonte, 2017 U.S. Regulatory Overview of Mobile Wallets and Mobile Payments, 17 
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 549 (2017) (describing the landscape of the chal-
lenges presented by mobile payments systems and associated risks).

